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CAN RESTITUTION SAVE FRAGILE
SPIDERLESS NETWORKS?
ARIEL PORAT* & ROBERT E. Scorr**
This Article examines the dramatic increase in business networks in recent
decades and considers whether the law can play a useful role in supporting the
efficient functioning of these inter-firm relationships for coordination and coop-
eration. Repeat play, reputational sanctions, and norms of trust and reciprocity
are the common explanations for the flourishing of networks in many industries
and places. But the evidence also shows that a certain class of networks often
fails to survive or function effectively and beneficial cooperation among these
network members is impaired. These fragile networks develop organically with-
out a controlling party or hierarchy at the center of the network to facilitate
network formation. Lacking a controlling entity, they are "webs without any
spider." Clusters of industrial districts are traditional examples of this class of
networks. More recently, the information revolution has stimulated a dramatic
increase in another type of "spiderless" network: networks of strategic alliances
are now a common means of organizing collaborations among firms in high
technology and R&D intensive settings. In both types of spiderless networks
there are no legal mechanisms to control moral hazard and free riding risks
during the period of network formation and operation. We show how in theory
the law could support spiderless networks by allowing firms who externalize
benefits to other firms in the network to recover for those benefits. Practical
considerations may limit the implementation of a full-blown right of restitution.
Nevertheless, by recognizing a limited right to recover for uncompensated costs
and benefits in appropriate cases, the law can function as a background norm
for sharing costs and benefits among network members, motivating them to
overcome daunting coordination problems. We consider several implementation
issues, show how they might be resolved, and apply our analysis to a set of well-
known spiderless networks.
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INTRODUCTION
When business parties want to collaborate they have traditionally pur-
sued either market transactions or integration. Starting in the twentieth cen-
tury, but continuing at a much greater pace in the past two decades as a
product of the "information revolution," business networks have emerged as
a third avenue for cooperation. Inter-firm networks are mechanisms for coor-
dination and cooperation between formally independent but functionally in-
terdependent firms. They provide firms with access to essential capabilities
and resources that are under the control of other firms in their environment.
Firms in networks frequently contract with others in the network to further
their network project. These contracts can create benefits for, or impose
costs on, other network members who are not contract parties. Addressing
the moral hazard, free riding, and distributional issues raised by these exter-
nalities in the absence of formal legal ties among participants has challenged
economists, sociologists, and organizational theorists. In lieu of legal mecha-
nisms, repeat play, reputational sanctions, and norms of trust and reciprocity
are the common explanations for the flourishing of networks in many indus-
tries and places.
Until recently, the question of why some networks are durable and
others are fragile has been largely ignored by legal scholars.' This lack of
attention to how networks emerge and stabilize owes, in part, to the fact that
legal intervention in networks is relatively rare. In addition, the overly broad
focus on a network as a generic mode of cooperation and collaboration is too
capacious to permit useful legal analysis. Some networks, for example, can
deploy standard contractual mechanisms-whether in the form of a master
contract as in the case of a franchise, or a bureaucratic contractual structure
as in the case of trade associations-that support network collaboration.
These relationships have a "spider in the web"-a controlling party or hier-
archy at the center of the network that facilitates network formation and
maintains stability.2 Other networks, however, are fundamentally symmetric
or parity-based. Lacking a controlling entity, they are webs without any spi-
der. In the case of these "spiderless networks," there are fewer legal mecha-
nisms to control moral hazard and free riding risks during the period of
network formation and operation.' As a consequence, the evidence shows
' Some significant exceptions are Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Benefi-
ciaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSis 325 (2015), and Lisa Bernstein,
Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Con-
tracts, 7 J. Legal Analysis 561 (2016).
2 We are grateful to Ron Gilson for suggesting the metaphor of the web with and without a
spider.
"There is not a sharp distinction between spider and spiderless networks. The distinction
we draw is primarily instrumental to the goals of this Article. We use the designation of a
spiderless network to describe any environment where network members create positive exter-
nalities for themselves and others in the network through repeated interactions and where there
are no contractual or organizational ties linking network members together.
3
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that many spiderless networks are fragile and fail to survive despite the evi-
dent benefits to network members from inter-firm cooperation.
In this Article, we focus on two key types of spiderless networks that
form organically to exploit the positive returns from coordination and coop-
eration but lack any centralized control. Clusters of industrial districts, such
as Silicon Valley, are traditional examples of one class of spiderless net-
works. This network type consists of geographically compact agglomera-
tions of small and medium sized firms in an industry characterized by
volatile or rapidly shifting demand, all of which specialize in a particular
phase of production or a production process.
In addition, the information revolution, and the consequent rise in un-
certainty, has stimulated a dramatic increase in another once-novel
spiderless network. Aggregations of strategic alliances, of which the biotech
network is the most familiar, are now a common mechanism for organizing
collaborations among firms in high-technology and R&D intensive settings. 4
Some of these alliance networks lack the social networking features-per-
sonnel mobility and geographical and cultural proximity-4hat support a
number of industrial districts. While there are bilateral contracts between
individual firms in these alliance networks, the network itself as a mode of
coordination and cooperation is not formalized into a contract or bureau-
cratic structure. Here the membership in the network is "vague and fluid";'
the actions of any party can create positive externalities for others, but the
same behavior also motivates moral hazard and free riding by others in the
network. These risks undermine what we call a "reciprocity equilibrium." A
reciprocity equilibrium results when each network member receives from the
network a benefit proportionate to the benefits it creates for others and the
costs it incurs.6 If network participants deviate significantly from a reciproc-
ity equilibrium, the network will fail to form successfully, or, even if
formed, further efficient participation and operation of the network may be
precluded. If, however, moral hazard and free riding problems can be miti-
gated, the network produces value by generating information flows that ad-
vance innovation and reduce the costs of the search for new alliance
partners.
4 Ranjay Gulati & Martin Gargiulo, Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come
From?, 104 AM. J. Soc. 1439, 1441, 1445 (1999) (stating that "the number of interorganiza-
tional [strategic] alliances has grown at an unprecedented rate in the last 15 years" and that
"most organizations are embedded in a variety of interorganizational networks, such as board
interlocks, trade associations, and research and development ventures"); Walter W. Powell &
Paul Brantley, Competitive Cooperation in Biotechnology: Learning through Networks?, in
NvTwolRKS AND ORGANIZATION: STRUCTURE FORM AND AcrION 366 (N. Mohria & R. Eccles
eds. 1992) ("In the past decade we have seen a pronounced shift away from a strict reliance on
internal R&D to a greater emphasis on various forms of externally based collaborative re-
search and development.").
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 356-57.
6 See infra Part I.B.2.
[Vol. 84
2018] Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks? 5
The starting point of our analysis is the formation of clusters and alli-
ance networks with particular focus on those industries where social capital'
is weak, and data show that externalities threaten network performance and
emerging networks frequently fail.' We ask, can the law usefully support the
formation and efficient operation of these networks that lack a spider in the
web? And, if so, under what conditions would legal remedies effectively
complement existing relational modes of motivating reciprocity among net-
work members?
To begin to answer these questions, we develop an informal model that
shows how the law of restitution and unjust enrichment can in theory en-
courage efficient network formation and operation by allowing key partici-
pants to receive some of the benefits currently captured by other
participants. Under the model, any member of a network who creates net
benefits for others, and whose costs are greater than private benefits, is enti-
tled to recover the lower of two measures: either the verifiable benefits cre-
ated for others or the difference between the benefactor's costs and benefits.9
The model also supports a distributional principle where the members are
entitled to share the network surplus according to their costs, the benefits
they received, and the benefits they conferred. While our model suggests
that restitution remedies can be most useful in supporting networks where
social capital is weak, it also has the potential of enhancing the efficiency of
even those networks that currently appear to function adequately without
any legal support.
After presenting the model, we explain how it could be implemented by
a straightforward extension of familiar common law doctrines. We also dis-
cuss some possible hurdles, including the costs of evaluation and enforce-
ment as well as the risk that a legal remedy may crowd out, rather than braid
with, the relational forces that otherwise support network formation. This
analysis argues against high-powered legal enforcement, such as the dis-
gorgement of all gains, and in favor of low-powered remedies, such as the
recovery of a portion of the realized benefits from network participation.
Even in the face of high evaluation and enforcement costs, however, a nar-
rowly structured right of restitution can still function as a background rule-a
focal point for sharing the benefits and costs among network members, moti-
vating these parties to overcome the coordination problems that otherwise
deter them from creating a spider to organize the distribution of network
value.10
7 Social capital refers to the creation of relation-specific trust between firms that is created
through interpersonal ties among key employees, the emergence of norms of reciprocity, and
experience in problem solving though information exchange. See, e.g., Sindad Roden & Benn
Lawson, Developing Social Capital in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: The Contingent Effect of
Relation-Specific Adaptations, 151 INT. J. PRODUCTION ECON. 89, 90-91 (2014).8 See infra Part I.B.3.
9 See infra Part II.C.
o See infra Part III.E. Our premise is that there is a positive, though imperfect, correlation
between network value and social welfare. Because the correlation between network value and
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This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we present a typology of
business networks sufficiently rich to capture the breadth of cooperative in-
ter-firm relationships, but also sufficiently parsimonious to serve as the basis
for understanding the relationship among the factors that determine how and
whether the network will emerge and how it will function. We show how
access to social capital distinguishes those spiderless networks that appear
quite stable (despite the absence of legal enforcement) from others where
high uncertainty and the absence of social capital make them more vulnera-
ble to uncontrolled moral hazard problems."I We focus on four exemplars of
how network benefits are disproportionately distributed among network
members and isolate the conditions under which the introduction of legal
remedies to support these fragile relationships might serve as complements
to existing relational norms.
In Part II, we develop an informal model under restrictive assumptions
to show how restitution remedies have the potential to aid in solving the
moral hazard and free riding problems characteristic of spiderless networks.
The model suggests clear criteria for implementing a remedial scheme and
illustrates how its application can support network formation and operation.
In Part III, we apply the model to the paradigmatic network contexts
where moral hazard and free riding problems threaten network survival. We
show how a limited right of restitution can overcome common objections to
using legal remedies to internalize network externalities. Even in a world of
high evaluation and enforcement costs, a narrowly crafted right of restitution
can still function as an efficient background norm-a bargain-enabling de-
faultl 2-that motivates members of spiderless networks to adopt a govern-
ance regime to regulate the cooperative relationship among the network
firms.
social welfare is imperfect, however, our normative views are tentatively held. An additional
justification for adopting network value as a criterion is that normative critique, when directed
at courts, should take into account the type of goal a court can implement. Courts are not
equipped to make global welfare assessments, but should be able to discern whether permitting
or denying a legal claim would better advance network goals.
" See infra Part I.A.2. Social capital ties that form in networks characterized by geograph-
ical concentration and personnel relationships are stronger in some networks, such as industrial
district clusters and biotech alliances, than they are in emerging alliances among widely sepa-
rated firms with different cultural patterns and little movement of personnel among the net-
work members. The key characteristic of the dramatic growth of strategic alliances in the last
several decades has been the increasing diversity of alliance partners' nationalities. See Ranjay
Gulati, Alliances and Networks, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 293, 302 (1998).
12 The concept of a "bargain-forcing default" was first developed in Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law,
104 CoLum. L. REV. 1428, 1488-90 (2004). In this context, "bargain-enabling" more accu-
rately describes the coordinating function that a background restitution rule provides for
spiderless networks. We choose the term "bargain-enabling" rather than the alternative of
"penalty" defaults because the latter has the narrower meaning of inducing disclosure when
disclosure would permit more efficient contracting performances. But see Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L. J. 87, 93 (1989) (discussing penalty default rules).
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We conclude that extending a carefully limited right of restitution to
members of spiderless networks can encourage them to reach contractual
solutions to the asymmetric distribution of network benefits. Networks are
dynamic forms of organization and the evolutionary process implies a move-
ment toward the development of a centralized regime-a spider-to control
distribution of network value. 3 The challenge is how best to stimulate the
evolutionary process before externality problems cause the network to fail.
A limited right to claim recovery for externalized benefits, even if only
available in special cases, can function as a "virtual spider" and thereby
reduce the incidence of failure in those networks that form spontaneously.
I. BusINEss NETWORKS AND THE EXTERNALITY PROBLEM
A. Factors that Distinguish Networks and their Governance
The starting point of a typology of business networks is the claim that
two characteristics of the particular environment-4he presence or absence of
a controlling regime or agent (the spider) and the uncertainty associated with
the market-determine the range of governance mechanisms that networks
require to overcome moral hazard and free riding problems.
1. Networks with Spiders
When networks are formed around, or by, a central agent-a regime that
exercises some control over the distribution of benefits and costs in the net-
work-the level of uncertainty determines how the parties respond to the
challenges of maintaining the network. As we illustrate in Figure 1, when
uncertainty is low, networks with controlling agents deploy more conven-
tional forms of contingent contracting to control conflicts among members.
Examples include franchises, 14 construction contracting,15 contemporary
13 The centralizing regime may be a bureaucratic mechanism to internalize benefits (as in
the case of cooperatives and trade associations) or a controlling agent (as in the case of the
purchasing firm in supply chains) with responsibility for devising mechanisms such as associa-
tion rules or master contracts that specify network obligations.
14 Claims by network members arise frequently in franchise networks. The disputes vary,
sometimes involving claims by franchisees (either existing or potential) arising out of contrac-
tual obligations assumed by the franchisor in the master-franchisee contract See, e.g., Chu v.
Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 171, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (claim by a prospective fran-
chisee suing on the basis of a settlement agreement between the franchisor and former
franchisees).
' Disputes over defective or failed performance in large construction projects frequently
arise in these networks where the litigation centers on disputes between the owner of the
project and various sub-contractors whose primary contractual relationship is with the general
contractor. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fireguard Corp., 455 S.E.2d 229 (Va. 1995);
A.E.I Music Network, Inc. v. Bus. Computs., Inc., 290 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2002); Guardsman
Elevator Co., Inc. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 577 (2001).
7
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credit card networks,1 6 standard setting organizations, 7 and networks formed
by hospitals with service providers, insurance companies, and patients." In
each case, there is an agent whose economic interests are advanced by the
creation of the network and who has incentives to control network size and
to internalize network externalities. Sometimes the optimal network size is
not sufficiently clear ex ante for the spider to write a master contract. But
even then, third-party beneficiary law permits parties to signal the intent to
cover third parties even though they have not been identified explicitly in the
ex ante contracting process.' 9 Another network form in this environment is
the trade association where control is formalized in associational contractual
agreements. Here the formal agreement specifies the organizational relation-
ships between allied parties, but the degree of formalization never substitutes
for the presence of a social capital network.20
FIGURE 1: NETWORK GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Spider Trade associations, franchises, Collaborative supply
construction Ks, credit cards, SSOs chains
No spider Industrial district clusters Strategic alliance
networks
Even in high uncertainty environments, spiders are capable of develop-
ing governance structures that rely on contract. Here the prime example is
the evolution of the modern supply chain that relies on collaborative con-
tracting between the suppliers and the buyer to coordinate vertical or trans-
actional interdependencies between and among the firms. 2 ' The higher level
16 See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 164 (3d Cit.
2008) (describing credit card networks).
" Standard-Setting Organizations (SSOs) form networks with members who rely on in-
dustry standards to "establish technical specifications to ensure that products from different
manufacturers are compatible with each other." Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d
872, 875 (9th Cir. 2012).
" Networks form between hospitals, hospital service providers, patients, insurers, and
HMOs. Third-party beneficiary suits are common in this category of networks. For cases
where patients sued as third-party bene?ciaries of contracts between hospitals and service
providers, see, for example, Jenkins v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Dorr v.
Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). For discussion, see Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 1.
" See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 329-33. Schwartz & Scott offer an improvement
on the current third-party beneficiary default of no third-party liability. By taking into account
network theory and the state's interest in preserving network functioning, they call for a more
precise understanding of when a spider would have the necessary intent to grant contract rights
to other network members.
20 See Anna Grandori & Giuseppe Soda, Inter-firm Networks: Antecedents, Mechanisms
and Forms, 16 ORG. STUD. 183, 201 (1995).
21 See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 14-27; Claude M6nard, The Economics of Hybrid Orga-
nizations, 160 J. INsT. & THEORETICAL EcoN. 345, 348 (2004). See generally J.H. TRIENEKENS
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of uncertainty does not preclude contract but does change the nature of con-
tracting. Facing conditions of high uncertainty, modem supply chains have
devised radically incomplete bilateral collaborative agreements together with
master contracts that commit the parties to collaborate but do not structure
the course or outcome of the collaboration. 22 Collaborative contracts braid
with the evolving social network that nurtures norms of coordination and
cooperation. Even though the contract is radically incomplete, the formal
legal mechanisms facilitate the parties' search for reliable partners and the
productive use of information generated through the network. As a conse-
quence of the braiding of formal and informal enforcement, trust develops
endogenously both within the bilateral collaborations as well as among the
members of the network. 23
In sum, incentive problems in the spider cases are mitigated by a com-
bination of bilateral contracts, third-party beneficiary law, multilateral
master contracting, and bureaucratic control. Moreover, all things equal, the
presence of a spider means that internalization is also easier to effect through
self-enforcement. Since the network size tends to be fixed, and network pur-
pose controlled by the spider, traditional mechanisms for informal or purely
relational contracting are more readily accessible. To be sure, moral hazard
and in particular free riding problems are common in these multilateral rela-
tionships. The formation of these networks often provides positive benefits
to third parties that free ride on the efforts of others in the network,24 and
even if they pay for the benefits they receive, their payments do not cover
the fixed costs sunk in the formation of the network. Nevertheless, despite
these inefficiencies the networks with a spider present fewer problems for
legal regulation than the webs that form without any spider.
2. Spiderless Networks
Networks that lack a central agent emerge and form organically and, as
in the case of networks with spiders, the structure of network governance is
determined by the level of uncertainty. As Figure 1 illustrates, lower levels
of uncertainty characteristic of the "traditional" economy have produced a
spiderless prototype-clusters of industrial districts. Although clusters re-
main viable today, the dramatic increase in spiderless networks has come
& P.J.P. ZUURBIER, CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN AGRIBUSINESS AND THE FOOD INDUSTRY: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WAGENINGEN, 25-26 MAY 2000
(2000); JOSH WHITFORD, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY: NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ORGA-
NIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING (2005).
22 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation:
Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 CoLUm. L. REV. 431, 459-63 (2009)
(discussing the John Deere supply chain).
23 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1377
(2010); Bernstein, supra note 1, at 28.
24 See, e.g., infra Part II.C.
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from the growth of strategic alliance networks: a network form adapted to
higher levels of uncertainty, where commercial practices are disrupted by
unforeseeable changes in technical possibilities and market conditions. We
briefly describe each network form and then turn to the challenge of devis-
ing a governance structure for spiderless networks.
a. Clusters of industrial districts.
Clusters of industrial districts are geographically compact agglomera-
tions of small and medium sized firms in an industry characterized by vola-
tile or rapidly shifting demand, all of which specialize in a particular phase
of production or a production process. Finished goods are produced by
groups of firms collaborating in rapidly shifting constellations.25 By recom-
bining and thereby augmenting fragmented, specialized, and mostly tacit
knowledge, a multiplicity of cooperative firms in a cluster adapts rapidly to
changes in the economic environment. Agglomerations of this kind played
an important role in the industrialization of parts of Europe and the United
States from the late eighteenth century onwards. 26 Variants are common in
more recent industrializers ranging from Japan 2 7 to Taiwan 28 to Brazil29 to
Italy30, and in the development of Silicon Valley.3 1 Since the turbulence in
the markets for mass-produced goods in the mid-1980s made valuable the
ease with which clustered firms could recombine as conditions changed,
clusters are a microcosm of the "new" economy, able to prosper in much
more volatile conditions than the vertically integrated large corporation.
25 Up to some limit, the more firms in a cluster, the easier it is for each firm to find the
partners it needs, and the lower its costs of production. Up to the size limit, therefore, firms in
a cluster constitute positive externalities for each other. The attraction of these positive exter-
nalities is part of what draws firms to the cluster in the first place, causing agglomeration. See
Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. PoL. ECON. 483 (1991)
(discussing why and when manufacturing becomes concentrated in a specific region); EDGAR
M. HOOVER & RAYMOND VERNON, ANATOMY OF A METROPOLIS: THE CHANGING DisTRIBU-
TION OF PEOPLE AND JOBS WITHIN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION 49-55 (1959) (argu-
ing that small firms operate in the more crowded portions of the region in order to share some
facilities, such as capital or labor, with others).
26 See WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES: FLEXIBILITY AND MASS PRODUCTION IN WESTERN INDUS-
TRIALIZATION 463, 499-500 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1997) (arguing that
collaboration between firms makes it easier to survive market fluctuations).
27 See generally DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MISUNDERSTOOD MIRACLE: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOP-
MENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN JAPAN (1988).
28 See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS: REGIONAL ADVANTAGE IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2006).
29 See generally Elisa Giuliani , Carlo Pietrobelli, & Roberta Rabellotti, et al., Upgrading
in Global Value Chains: Lessons from Latin American Clusters, 33 WORLD DEV. 549, 549-73
(2005).
30 See generally Roberta Rabellotti, Anna Carabelli & Giovanna Hirsch, Italian Industrial
Districts on the Move: Where are They Going?, 17 EUR. PLAN. STuD. 19, 19-41 (2008).
I See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETI-
TION IN SRICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of
High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Com-
pete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575-628 (1999).
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b. Strategic alliance networks.
Strategic alliances are bilateral collaborations between firms that are
motivated to resolve uncertainty over the challenges of rapid technological
development where research breakthroughs are so broadly distributed that no
single firm has all the capabilities necessary for success. Research to pro-
duce further technological advances thus requires collective collaboration
designed to pool the broadly dispersed information of a large number of
firms.32 Over time, these alliances aggregate to form a cluster-or network-
of firms whose membership shifts over time and who lack any centralized
control. The network grows during periods of rapid change as members are
motivated to reduce the inherent uncertainties associated with novel products
or markets through the sharing of private information that benefits each firm
in its own pursuits.33
Despite the absence of a spider, there is significant information ex-
change and co-development in alliance networks, leading to long-term com-
mitments between alliance partners in the network. The alliances act as a
conduit for the flow of private information about resources and capabilities.
The knowledge created by the information exchange within the individual
alliances in the network diffuses throughout the network. Thus, the network
becomes a reservoir of all the informational value that accumulates within
that particular sphere of economic activity.3 4
At one time, these alliance networks were rare but in the current econ-
omy they have grown dramatically and are now a common mechanism for
organizing cooperative activity, particularly in technology-intensive set-
tings.35 The prototype of these strategic alliances is the biotech network con-
sisting of a university or research entity (inventor), a number of biotech
companies, large pharmaceutical firms, and venture capital firms joined by
their common interest in the development of therapeutic compounds to cure
disease.36
32 See WALTER W. PowELL, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: Opportunities and
Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive Field, in Ex-
PANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWL-
EDGE SOCIETY 251, 252-53 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
* Id. at 265-66.
34 Balaji R. Koka & John E. Prescott, Designing Alliance Networks: The Influence of Net-
work Position, Environmental Change and Strategy on Firm Performance, 29 Strategic Mgmt.
J. 639, 640 (2008).
" See MICHAEL HERGERT & DEIGAN MORRIS, Trends in International Collaborative
Agreements, in COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (F.K. Contractor & S.
Leinhardt eds., 1988) (analyzing the increasing use of collaborative agreements between inter-
national partners); David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of
Strategic Alliances, 23 J. L. & EcON. ORG. 242, 245 (2006) (showing over 5500 alliances
between dedicated biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical firms, and universities have been
formed since the mid-1970s).
36 These networks have been widely studied by organizational sociologists. See, e.g., Wal-
ter W. Powell, Kenneth Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Interorganizational Collaboration and
the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 116
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B. Characteristics of Spiderless Networks and the Governance Problem
In this section, we examine the key elements in the formation of
spiderless networks with particular focus on the challenge of preserving the
value generated by the network itself.
1. Network Formation and Resulting Value
How do spiderless networks emerge in the absence of the coordinating
capabilities of a central agent? Organizational sociologists have traditionally
looked to exogenous factors, such as the distribution of technological re-
sources, that motivate firms to create the ties necessary to manage uncer-
tainty and satisfy their resource needs."7 But this focus on exogenous
conditions ignores the fundamental question of how a firm comes to choose
its alliance partners. Gulati and Gargiulo present a theory with supporting
data that suggests that the risk of opportunism motivates firms to select part-
ners with whom they have or can develop trust sufficient' to support the
iterative exchange of private information. 8 Over time, these "embedded"
relationships develop into a network that has unique value as a repository of
information about the capability and character of prospective partners. The
more that the network internalizes information about potential partners, the
more firms look to the network in searching for new partners. Through this
iterative process, new entrants gain valuable information and also contribute
new knowledge to the network that shapes the formation of future network
collaborations. 39
The aggregation of information about prospective partners creates a
value to participation in the network independent of any surplus from the
bilateral agreements formed between individual network dyads. Firms de-
velop many ties to others who in turn have ties to others and thus become
highly embedded in the network. Embeddedness, in turn, diffuses valuable
information throughout the network.4 0 In this way, networks foster learning
by encouraging novel syntheses of information that is qualitatively distinct
(1996); Walter W. Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry,
152 J. INST. & THEORETICAL EcON. 197 (1996); see also Powell & Brantley, supra note 4;
Powell, supra note 32.
3 See, e.g., Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, supra note 36, at 119 ("A network serves as a
locus of innovation because it provides timely access to knowledge and resources that are
otherwise unavailable . . . ."); Powell, supra note 36, at 205 (noting the necessity of pooling
capabilities and assets as a key factor in inter-organizational collaboration in the biotechnology
industry); RONALD S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COO'1FATION: NETWORKS OF MARKET
CONSTRAINTS AND DIRECTORATE TIES IN THE AMERICAN EcONOMY (1983).
" Gulati & Gargiulo, supra note 4, at 1440-42.
'9 See id. at 1440.
40 The network generates value that is shared in two ways. There are "internal" benefits
that each dyad realizes through its participation in the network. In addition, there are "exter-
nal" network benefits that are disproportionately distributed throughout the network. For a
discussion regarding the various means that firms use to capture network benefits, see infra
Part I.C.
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from the information that resides in the individual dyads. 4 1 This reservoir of
valuable information serves to reduce the cost of searching for new partners
and also enables embedded firms to exploit the knowledge acquired in any
given strategic alliance or cluster by combining it with complementary
knowledge gained from other sources. 42 In short, the network serves as a
club good that reduces contracting costs and enhances innovation opportuni-
ties for network members. If the network matures to the point where the
community norms are entirely self-enforcing, the network is a substitute for
the legal enforcement of the radically incomplete contracts that are formed
between alliance and cluster members. 43
2. Moral Hazard and Free Riding Risks to Achieving a Reciprocity
Equilibrium
The essential conflict in both cluster and alliance networks is the incen-
tive for cooperation and coordination side by side with the incentive for
competition. Parties share the motivation to capture as many benefits as pos-
sible at the lowest possible cost, and at the same time are motivated to act
reciprocally in forming and maintaining the network. Reciprocal actions
among network members satisfy what we have called a "reciprocity equilib-
rium," when every network member receives from the network a benefit
proportionate to the benefits it creates for others and the costs it incurs.44 But
a reciprocity equilibrium is a unique condition. Things become more compli-
cated when some members capture more or fewer benefits than what is justi-
fied under the reciprocity condition, either because of their different
capabilities in extemalizing or internalizing benefits or because of moral
hazard and free riding problems. Moral hazard is motivated by members'
desire to save costs since the benefits they produce are shared by others; free
riding is motivated by members' desire to capture benefits produced by other
members and avoid the costs of producing those same benefits. These self-
interested actions undermine the reciprocity equilibrium and thus threaten
the durability of spiderless networks.
41 Powell, supra note 4, at 371 (arguing that external linkages are means of gaining fast
access to knowledge and resources that cannot be secured internally ""by ... bringing to-
gether different operating assumptions and new combinations of information")."). For discus-
sion and examples, see discussion infra Parts I.C.2-4.
42 Firms use their network position to capture network externalities in two ways: (1) by
developing many ties with others and thus exploiting an information-rich network position, or
(2) by bridging a gap in the network (a "structural hole") that enables the firm to exploit
resource and informational differentials within the network. See Jeffrey H. Dyer, Harbir Singh
& Prashant Kale, Splitting the Pie: Rent Distribution in Alliances and Networks, 29 MANAGE-
RIAL & DEcisION EcoN. 137, 137-48 (2008) (discussing how collaborating firms split the
surplus of their collaboration); infra Part I.C.
43 Robinson & Stuart, supra note 35, at 244 (arguing that the alliance network functions as
a social institution that aids in contract enforcement, and, therefore, "plays the same role as the
court").
"For further discussion on allocating network surplus among members to achieve a reci-
procity equilibrium, see infra Part II.C.5.
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In strategic alliance networks it is often the case that firms with many
ties to others become structurally embedded in the network while others that
are not as well connected remain on the periphery. 45 To collaborate with
centrally embedded firms, peripheral firms offer specific resources, espe-
cially private information, to their alliance partners. In this way, some em-
bedded firms are able to extract rents from those firms that are less
connected, and, at the same time, these highly embedded firms can use their
prior connections to build new ties and so remain deeply embedded in the
network. 46 In short, the rich get richer: a firm that has a greater number of
alliance relationships or that bridges a "structural hole" in the network fre-
quently can enjoy network benefits that are not available to a peripheral
network member. In this way, the highly embedded firm receives more and
contributes less than the less embedded firm, and the reciprocity condition is
not satisfied. 47
To illustrate the consequences of these asymmetries, consider a scenario
where facilitating the network's formation requires the participation of a firm
whose costs of participation are greater than its expected benefits, but lower
than the expected benefits for all members once the network forms. For ex-
ample, assume that an owner of a "magnet" enterprise is contemplating lo-
cating in an industrial district; the magnet firm's participation is expected to
generate a substantial percentage of the positive externalities from participat-
ing in the network. The other network parties are small firms that are ex-
pected to aggregate around the magnet firm once the industrial district is
stabilized. The magnet enterprise, however, needs to invest in creating the
network: it has to relocate its large facilities, and relocation is costly. The
firm also bears the risk that the network may fail, and then it would bear
irrecoverable losses and gain no corresponding benefits. The network in this
example is a club good: once it is formed, participating firms can use the
proximity and tacit knowledge of others to their benefit and no one can ex-
clude them. Thus, the resulting risk of free riding may prevent the network's
formation.48
In other cases, other transaction costs could bar efficient operation of
networks. For example, imagine that a firm at the periphery of an alliance
network calculates that the firm's costs of revealing private information ex-
ceed the expected benefits from a collaborative agreement with another net-
work member even though the information, once disseminated, would create
45 See Gautam Ahuja, Francisco Polidoro Jr. & Will Mitchell, Structural Homophily or
Social Asymmetry? The Formation of Alliances by Poorly Embedded Firms, 30 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 941, 941 (2009).
46 See id. at 944-45. See infra Part I.C., where we discuss the asymmetric distribution of
private network benefits.
4 Dyer et al., supra note 42, at 143-45; see also infra Part I.C.
48 Unless payments are made to the magnet firm, it will not establish the network. Pay-
ments would not be made, however, because, absent coordination, each of the other firms
would refuse to share in the costs of establishing the network, hoping to free ride on other
members' investments.
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net benefits to other network firms in excess of the peripheral firm's costs.
Ideally, other members would agree to compensate the peripheral firm and
induce it to reveal its private information. But the difficulty of negotiating a
sharing rule in a high uncertainty environment could preclude any agreement
to share the costs of subsidizing the peripheral firm.49
3. Relational Governance of Spiderless Networks
Under current law, enforcement of inter-party understandings in alli-
ance and cluster networks is purely relational. Spiderless networks use a
reputation for cooperation and trustworthiness as a guide to future interac-
tion, relying on a combination of reputation, repeated dealings, and tit-for-tat
reciprocity to distribute network value. 0 In some instances, these relational
norms can produce a durable network environment. Thus, for example, the
evidence suggests that, despite the absence of formal rights and obligations,
the forces that govern cooperation in mature biotech alliances are quite ro-
bust, with trust and cooperation increasing with participation in the
network.'
The evidence of successful formation of strategic alliance networks is
quite mixed, however. Biotech networks are supported by a strong form of
social capital ties: social capital is particularly useful in alliances where the
contribution of each alliance member to the network is ambiguous and diffi-
cult to measure. 52 But in industries that are not characterized by strong forms
of social capital, there is substantial evidence that spiderless networks are
highly delicate and prone to fail. Here, the individual firms face serious in-
centive problems and often fail to overcome the transaction costs of forming
a network that survives to maintain cooperative norms. 53 In particular, strate-
gic alliances among disparate firms from a wide range of national origins (a
very common circumstance in the global economy) face a variety of moral
hazard and free riding risks caused by the difficulty of learning about the
49 See Gilson et al., supra note 23, at 1405-09 (explaining the phenomenon of incomplete
preliminary agreements that adapt ex post to changed circumstances, and that regulate only an
agreement to collaborate rather than the outcome of the collaboration).
so See Powell, supra note 36, at 207-08.
51 In durable networks, there is a kind of mutualism or normative integration at the level
of the network community. This community-level mutualism is both self-maintaining and self-
enforcing. See Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties
for Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 AcAC. MGMT. J. 85, 91-93 (1995) (analyzing data
concerning industrial alliances and concluding that the existence of trust stemming from prior
interactions affects the chosen contractual form).
52 See generally William G. Ouchi & Michelle K. Bolton, The Logic of Joint Research and
Development, 30 CAL. MGMT'. REV. 9 (1988).
" See Joel M. Podoiny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV.
Soc. 57, 71 (1998) ("Journalistic and management sources are essentially unanimous in the
conclusion that an extremely large proportion of at least one common type of network organi-
zation-strategic alliances-result in failure."). To be sure, even absent moral hazard and other
incentive problems, we would not expect all strategic alliance networks to succeed. They are
capital investments, which, like others, sometimes will fail and sometimes will succeed.
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competencies and character of potential partners.54 In this setting, a potential
partner may either limit its contribution to the network or, in the alternative,
behave opportunistically by taking advantage of its network position to ex-
ploit resources or information gained from others. Moreover, as noted above,
in the case of clusters, the inability of network members to agree on sharing
rules impairs the ability to attract founding members or new entrants whose
costs of entry may exceed their private benefits.
C. Four Exemplars of Externalities in Spiderless Networks
In this section, we describe four exemplars of how network benefits are
disproportionately distributed among spiderless network members. In each
case, there is an asymmetry of costs and benefits that can threaten network
formation and duration.
1. Magnet Firms and Late Arrivals
As we noted above, the industrial district cluster is an example of a
spiderless network that forms organically as a function of the synergies from
agglomeration." The industrial cluster is similar to, but not the same as, the
alliance network. It is similar in the sense that the network creates benefits
from agglomeration that are more than simply the sum of all its participants'
actions. An asymmetry of network costs and benefits can result, however, as
a byproduct of the relatively greater importance of magnet enterprises.
While the magnet firm externalizes substantial benefits on other network
members, it receives fewer benefits from them. If the asymmetry is suffi-
ciently large, the magnet would not move to, or act to create, the industrial
district even when it would be socially desirable. If the private benefits the
firm expects to derive from its relocation are less than private costs, the
network won't form even though the total social benefits-including the posi-
tive externalities conferred upon others-are greater than the magnet's pri-
vate costs.
Assuming that magnet enterprises fortuitously are already located in the
putative industrial district, the agglomeration process can proceed organi-
cally, but further problems arise as relocation costs-such as land values and
labor costs-rise over time such that later arrivals face higher participation
costs than earlier arrivals. In this case, as we indicate in Part III, the mobility
5 The reputation sharing process at the heart of a network deteriorates with distance. See
AVINASH K. Dixrr, LAWLESSNESS AND EcoNoMics: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE
(2011); see also Yves L. Doz, The Evolution of Cooperation in Strategic Alliances: Initial
Conditions or Learning Processes?, 17 STRATEGIC MGMTr. J. 55, 68 (1996); Bruce Kogut, A
Study of the Life Cycle of Joint Ventures, 28 MGMT. INT'L REV. 39, 49 (1988).
55 To be sure, some industrial districts are formed by state subsidies and thus are formed
around spiders, but our concern remains those that can form organically.
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of skilled labor among network firms is an important value as it increases
social capital and indirectly redistributes network benefits.
The most salient American example of a cluster with these properties
that nonetheless may be vulnerable to disruption is the Silicon Valley net-
work that emerged in the 1990s around several successful computer technol-
ogy-related firms and Stanford University in California. These magnet
entities motivated startup enterprises to locate in Silicon Valley."6 In turn, the
surge in the number of Silicon Valley startups induced a number of venture
capital firms either to relocate to Menlo Park and its environs or to expand
their Silicon Valley offices. This, in turn, encouraged more entrepreneurs to
locate their startups there. Ultimately, venture capitalists, dot-com startups,
and other R&D entities clustered in and around the geographical area. This
clustering produced a parallel effect in the labor market as engineers, scien-
tists, and software designers moved to the area in search of better job oppor-
tunities. This skilled labor was highly mobile, and, as it moved among firms,
social capital increased in the cluster. In turn, this concentration of techni-
cally skilled labor increased the incentive for new startup enterprises to lo-
cate in a region where there was an ample supply of skilled labor.
But the formation of a cluster network is dynamic and vulnerable to
exogenous shock. In the case of Silicon Valley, for example, the increase in
the cluster of business and labor has fueled a dramatic increase in residential
and commercial real estate costs, as well as deterioration in ancillary ser-
vices owing to rapid growth." This has led a number of firms to move to
alternative locations such as Austin, Texas and Raleigh-Durham, North Car-
olina. 8 To be sure, these changes don't necessarily doom the Silicon Valley
cluster. But they do imply that the cluster will not function as efficiently as it
might have if the network had a mechanism to redistribute costs and benefits
more efficiently. In short, to sustain cluster performance in the longer term,
clusters need to manage network openness to business outside the cluster
while facilitating strong inter-organizational relationships within the
cluster. 9
56 For a time, the Silicon Valley cluster was in competition with the cluster that was form-
ing around Route 128 in Boston, Massachusetts. The Route 128 cluster withered, in large part,
because the mobility of scientific talent was impeded by the enforceability of covenants not to
compete in Massachusetts. Non-compete agreements are generally unenforceable in Califor-
nia. Gilson, supra note 31, at 578.
" See Nitin Dahad, As Technology Booms, U.S. Startups Are Driven Beyond Silicon Val-
ley, THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.thenextsiliconvalley.com/2015/11/
23/3885-us-startups-are-driven-beyond-silicon-valley/ (discussing the side effect of rapid
growth in technological clusters).
58 Id.
5 See Andreas B. Eisingerich & Leslie Boehm, Group Analysis: Why Some Regional
Clusters Work Better Than Others, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 15, 2007) https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB 118841858437012520?mg=prod/accounts-wsj (discussing three factors that are especially
powerful in determining a cluster's competitiveness and growth potential).
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2. Free Riding on Indirect Ties
A firm can also benefit differentially from participation in a strategic
alliance network to the extent that it can exploit knowledge gained indirectly
from other network members that are not alliance partners. A simple exam-
ple illustrates the point: Imagine that Firm A has an alliance with Firm B
that, in turn, has an alliance with Firm C. In the course of the B-C alliance, C
obtains private information attributable to A that C can exploit elsewhere by
transferring that knowledge to other business projects within the firm that
are not directly related to the alliance with B. The resulting private benefits
are those that C can earn unilaterally to the extent that it has the capacity in
other projects to realize the benefit. The successful exploitation of Firm A's
private information is thus a function of the degree to which Firm C's scope
of resources and activities are related to the activities of Firm A.
The alliance between Apple and Sony to assemble Apple's successful
PowerBook line of portable computers provides a useful case study of how
private benefits are exploited through indirect acquisition of knowledge.6 0
The Apple-Sony alliance linked Apple's capability in designing easy-to-use
computer products with Sony's miniaturization capabilities. Apple's exper-
tise in producing the laptop computer was developed, in turn, through con-
tractual alliances with other strategic partners, including IBM. 6' Although
both Apple and Sony benefitted from the success of the PowerBook, Sony
ultimately realized greater private benefits due to synergies between its con-
sumer electronics business and its growing computer business.62 Sony used
the alliance with Apple, including knowledge developed by IBM (and later
transferred to Apple), to learn how to design and manufacture laptop com-
puters as well as allied consumer electronics. While Apple earned private
benefits from its alliance with Sony, none of those benefits accrued to its
other strategic partners, including IBM. In this way, Sony was able to free
ride on the network benefits that IBM had generated in its alliance with Ap-
ple. These indirect and extra-contractual transfers of private information are
positive externalities common to strategic alliance networks, but if benefit-
60 See generally Brenton R. Schlender, Apple's Japanese Ally: Its New Notebook Com-
puter -Made by Sony-Shows Why Alliances Are Hot in the PC Business, FORTUNE MAGAZINE
(Nov. 4, 1991), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archivell991/11/04/
75695/index.htm.
61 See, e.g., Bos. GLOBE, Important events in the saga of Apple Computer Inc. (Jun. 8,
1997), http://www.boston.com/globe/business/packages/microsoft-apple/apple-chron.htm
(presenting Apple's business history).
62 Andrew C. Inkpen & Adva Dinur, Knowledge Management Processes and Interna-
tional Joint Ventures, in 9 ORG. Sci. 454, 455 (Aug. 1998) ("Sony ... has formed various
alliances with computer and telecommunications firms in an effort to forge new technology
linkages for its consumer electronics products. The alliances give Sony access to a wealth of
new knowledge."). Before its alliance with Apple, Sony had little experience in the computer
industry. The firm used knowledge from the Apple-IBM alliance to launch its own popular line
of laptop computers. See Dyer et al., supra note 41, at 142.
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ing firms are able to free ride on this knowledge, network value will decline
and network performance and durability will be impaired.
3. Exploiting "Structural Holes"
Firms that are strategically embedded in alliance networks can capture a
disproportionate share of the network's benefits by exploiting their position
in the network. Specifically, some firms are able to bridge gaps, known as
"structural holes," in the network by brokering relationships with other par-
ties who are not directly connected to each other. Firms that occupy a posi-
tional monopoly in networks with many structural holes can exert control
over information flows and thereby extract monopoly rents from alliance
partners. These firms not only share in the common benefits generated with
their alliance partners but also extract private benefits-access to informa-
tion or resources-4hat are a function of their controlling position in the
network.
The ability to exploit a positional monopoly in the network is well illus-
trated by the Tata Group, the largest business group in India." Tata operates
in a number of different industries, including steel, automobiles, hotels, and
information technology. The Tata Group, as India's largest IT firm, has many
alliances with foreign firms wishing to do business in India.64 There are also
many smaller Indian firms with strong capabilities in IT, especially in
software development. 65 But these smaller firms, lacking Tata's size and
long-term presence in the market, are not able to form alliances directly with
foreign entities.6 6 Tata's alliances with foreign firms provide privileged ac-
cess to information about positive value projects, product specifications and
pricing, and new developments in relevant technologies. To be sure, some
portion of Tata's ability to extract more favorable terms in its alliance con-
tracts with the smaller Indian firms is a return on its investment in reputa-
tion. Lending that reputation to the Indian startups justifies a market return.
However, the private benefits of control it enjoys by bridging this gap also
permits Tata to extract monopoly rents from its smaller Indian partners when
together they form alliances to service the needs of large foreign customers.
In essence, the monopoly rents take the form of free riding on a portion of
the network benefits contributed by the smaller Indian firms. 67 One conse-
quence of this imbalance in the distribution of network benefits may be
63 See generally WIKIPEDIA, List of entities associated with Tata Group (as of Sep. 26,
2015, 9:59 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=list-of-entities-associated-with
_TataGroup&oldid=68290851 1.
* See, e.g., TATA, Tata Strategic Management Group enters into an alliance with Roland
Berger Strategy Consultants, (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.tata.com/company/releasesinside/
sXzPuLZHI!$$$$!E=/TLYVr3YPkMU=.
65 See, e.g., WIKtPEDIA, List of Indian IT companies, (as of Dec. 5, 2015, 8:46 PM), https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=list of_IndianITcompanies&oldid=693914671.
66 Dyer et al., supra note 42, at 143-44.
67 Id.
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found in the evidence that many of these international strategic alliance net-
works are fragile and prone to disintegration.68
4. Exploiting Informational Synergies
We noted above that networks generate informational value that is inde-
pendent of the value produced in any individual alliance dyad. Informational
synergies develop from the ability of firms to acquire different sources of
private information from many different alliance partners. Thus, a firm in an
alliance network that occupies a central position with many network partners
can use the diverse sources of information gathered from each alliance to
make better-informed investment decisions going forward. The capabilities
developed by a centrally positioned firm as a result of knowledge gained
from the network of alliances are private benefits that are only indirectly
related to any particular alliance relationship. These private benefits will not
be available to alliance partners with only a small number of relationships.
Assuming each party in the network expends an equivalent cost in the infor-
mation revelation that contributes to the network's information-rich environ-
ment, some firms are capturing a disproportionate share of the benefits,
merely as a function of their position in the network. This asymmetry of
costs and benefits is yet another way that network externalities can threaten
network durability.
Microsoft is an example of a firm that has a large number of alliance
ties with various technology firms and, as a consequence of its size and
financial resources, occupies a central position in the computing industry
alliance network.6 9 Microsoft's central position in its alliance network gives
it access to more and better information than its alliance partners. The result-
ing synergies position Microsoft to better determine what positive- value
projects it should pursue in the future. Dyer, Singh, and Kale report that
interviews with Microsoft's alliance partners reveal dissatisfaction with the
asymmetric distribution of network benefits: Microsoft is viewed as a fairly
undesirable alliance partner in terms of generating reciprocal benefits in an
alliance.70 One explanation for the negative reaction of other network mem-
bers to their association with Microsoft is the realization that Microsoft is
able to exploit its central position in the network to accumulate uncompen-
sated benefits in excess of its contribution to the network.
68 See supra text accompanying notes ????-47.
6 See YVEs Doz & GARY HAMEL, ALLIANCE ADVANTAGE: THE ART OF CREATING VALUE
THROUGH PARTNERING 233 (Harv. Bus. Press 1998) (claiming "Microsoft has been able to
enroll nearly the entire information technology industry in its alliance network"); see also
David Kirkpatrick, These Days Everybody Needs a Microsoft Strategy, FORTUNE MAGAZINE
(Jan. 12, 1998), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/1998/01/12/
236432/index.htm (discussing businesses' necessity in forming strategic partnerships with
Microsoft).
70 Dyer et al., supra note 42, at 145.
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5. The Effects of Externalities on Network Performance and
Longevity
The preceding exemplars illustrate the differences between clusters and
strategic alliance networks, and the differences affect the performance and
longevity of the two types of networks in different ways. In clusters, forma-
tion and stabilization of the industrial district require mechanisms to moti-
vate magnet firms to locate within the cluster and to ensure that late arrivals
that face higher costs can receive compensating benefits. In this way, the
common benefits created by the cluster are redistributed with the goal of
allocating the network surplus in proportion to members' benefits conferred
and costs incurred. In alliance networks, firms form dyads that produce pri-
vate alliance benefits that are shared contractually while some-few-firms
are able to capture a disproportionate share of the network's common value.
A given firm's calculus whether to participate in maintaining the network is
thus a function of its costs, including opportunity costs, and the combination
of network and private or contractual benefits it receives. As a generaliza-
tion, networks that generate both high network benefits and high private
benefits for the firms in the network will produce the most durable alliances
and thus increase the efficiency and longevity of the network. Alternatively,
networks in which many firms experience low network benefits and low
private benefits relative to a few embedded firms would be the least stable."
To the extent that the four exemplars of network externalities described
above illustrate a general phenomenon, the question with which we began
then becomes salient: Can legal remedies that facilitate internalization be
adapted to an environment in which high measurement and litigation costs
are likely to impede firms seeking to redistribute network value?
What should courts do when asked to consider legal claims for ex-
ploitation of network value or free riding on network information? We an-
swer that question in two stages. In Part II, we develop a model that shows
how restitution can in theory be used to support a reciprocity equilibrium in
spiderless networks by authorizing the recovery of uncompensated benefits
given to others. We turn, then, in Part III to consider how a narrowly circum-
scribed right of restitution would apply to the four exemplars described
" Intermediate combinations of network and private benefits are more difficult to evalu-
ate. It might be the case that alliance networks characterized by low network benefits and high
private benefits for most alliance members could still be reasonably stable. For example, Wal-
Mart's alliances with many retailers permit it to exercise its control and central position in the
network to extract a larger share of the network value as private benefits. Nevertheless, its
partners may be content to accept the high private benefits generated by the alliance even if
their network benefits are low. See Dyer et al., supra note 42, at 146.
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above and evaluate objections to extending restitution remedies to these net-
work contexts.
II. RESTITUTION THEORY AND SPIDERLESS NETWORKS
In this Part, we address the question whether legal enforcement can
supplement relational norms and efficiently constrain the self-interested ac-
tions that otherwise undermine the formation and operation of spiderless net-
works. Using the reciprocity equilibrium as a baseline, we develop an
informal model that specifies rights of restitution for network members. The
model is based on two central tenets of restitution law. The first tenet is that
a party who voluntarily confers benefits on others can, under specified con-
ditions, recover the value of those benefits from the beneficiaries. The sec-
ond tenet is that a party who takes value belonging to others without
reciprocating in kind must pay for the benefits she received. Here we extend
those two tenets beyond their current application under prevailing law, and
show how they could function in spiderless networks. Part III then applies
the model to the set of paradigmatic cases described above where moral
hazard and free riding risks hinder the formation and operation of efficient
networks.
A. Liability for Unrequested Benefits
1. Prevailing Law
When a benefactor voluntarily confers benefits upon recipients, the law
generally does not impose a duty of restitution on the recipient. This rule has
certain exceptions, 7 2 however, and the common fund cases are the most rele-
vant to our analysis. "Common funds" are monies obtained through legal
proceedings initiated by one party against which others are entitled to assert
claims. 73 Under certain conditions, the initiator of the legal proceedings is
entitled to collect from the other fund recipients their relative shares in the
expenses he incurred in the process, even if they refused to back his efforts
at the outset.7 4 An illustration is the case of an heir who initiates legal pro-
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 30 cmt. a (AM.
LAw INsT. 2011) ("[Tlhe law of restitution for unrequested benefits, intentionally conferred,
combines a broadly negative proposition with a series of exceptions.").
" For common fund cases, see John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Pub-
lic Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1975); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involun-
tary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HAitv. L. REv. 1597 (1974); and Saul Levmore,
Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65, 95-99 (1985).
74 Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 30(2)(b) allows recovery in
cases where "the recipient obtains a benefit in money," thereby substantially broadening the
common funds category of cases. See supra note 72. Section 29 sets out specific conditions
under which "a person who has incurred expenses or rendered services to preserve or create a
'fund' in which others are interested may require the others-in the absence of contract-to
contribute ratably to the cost of securing the common benefit." Id.
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ceedings resulting in an increase in the value of the estate to the benefit of
the other heirs.7 5 Another relevant category of cases encompasses those in-
stances in which one party protects or preserves an interest he shares with
another party, thereby benefiting the latter, without her prior consent to pay
for this benefit.76 A common example is a co-owner of property who incurs
expenses to maintain or protect the property, thereby benefiting the other co-
owners." Here, the co-owner who bears the costs can recover from the
others in the amount of their relative shares."
Several other categories of cases when restitution remedies are granted
for conferral of unrequested benefits offer further support for the general
principal that actions which preserve another's economic interest can trigger
a right to restitution even in the absence of a prior understanding.79 To be
sure, in each of these cases, reaching an agreement prior to the conferral of
the benefit was infeasible or impractical, the benefactor was pursuing his
own interests while the benefit to the other party was incidental, and the
benefactor protected or preserved existing entitlements and did not create
new ones.s0
2. Private Production of Public Goods
A principal application of an expanded duty of restitution is the private
production of public goods when, absent legal intervention, free riding and
other transaction costs bar their production. Assume, for example, a benefac-
" For examples of suits brought by an heir against his or her co-heirs, see id. § 29 cmt. g,
illus. 23-25; 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.7 (1978).
7 See supra note 72 §§ 26-29; see also HANocH DAGAN, THE LAW AN) ETHics or RESTI-
TrrION 125-26 (2004) (presenting exceptional cases in which the Second Restatement does
allow restitution for unrequested benefits); Levmore, supra note 73, at 65-68 (same).
" E.g., 2 PALMER, supra note 75, § 10.7(c); Daniel Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, Pursu-
ance of Self-Interest, and the Limits of Free Riding, 36 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 831, 855-58 (2003).
7 See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Caroprop, Ltd., 446 S.E.2d 415, 416-17 (S.C. 1994)
(holding that when one cotenant stops paying his share of taxes and mortgage payments, other
cotenants may pay his share and recover from him).
7 Rescue cases are another category of cases where recovery for unrequested benefits
may be granted. See supra note 72, §§ 20-21; 2 PALMER, supra note 75, § 10.4. See generally
Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good Samaritan, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1152 (1999) (analyzing
rescue cases and supporting a broad duty of restitution). These are instances where the bene-
factor has acted to protect the recipient's life, health, property, or other economic interest when
the latter's consent could not be obtained due to the emergency nature of the circumstances.
Under certain conditions, the law allows the benefactor to recover a reasonable charge for his
beneficial actions. For other categories, see Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Good:
Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 195-98 (2009).
8 Limiting the restitution duty to those circumstances where high transaction costs render
a prior agreement implausible is quite obviously designed to encourage consensual agree-
ments. The rationales for the second and third conditions are less obvious. Requiring the bene-
factor to be motivated by his own interests and only incidentally intent on conferring benefits
to others prevents the emergence of an extensive practice of sellers providing benefits through
avenues other than market transactions, while requiring the protection and preservation of
existing entitlements reflects the law's preference for maintaining the status quo over a broader
principle of maximizing welfare. See Porat, supra note 79, at 197-98.
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tor considers constructing a park on her land that will increase the market
value of neighboring homes: the costs to the benefactor in creating the park
are higher than her private benefits, but lower than the common benefits
shared by her neighbors. The resulting benefits are a public good: no one can
prevent the beneficiaries from enjoying the benefits of the park's environ-
ment once it is created.8' But since each beneficiary knows that the creation
of the public good does not depend on his decision to share in the costs of
production, no one is motivated to share in the costs, and, as a consequence,
the economically beneficial park may not be created. A properly designed
restitution remedy can ameliorate this inefficiency, however. Here, the goal
of reducing enforcement costs, and in particular the risk of overvaluation,
argues for the recovery to be limited to the lower of two measures: either the
verifiable benefit gained by the beneficiaries or their relative share of the
reasonable costs of producing the benefit.8 2 By allowing the benefactor to
recoup a portion of his costs from the beneficiaries in cases where the costs
of evaluation are tractable and market mechanisms or governmental inter-
vention are not available, the law can motivate the benefactor to act unilater-
ally and create the public good to the benefit of all."
If the duty of restitution were expanded as suggested above, it would
also be applicable to spiderless networks. Forming a spiderless network, and
providing collective benefits through it, is often the production of a public
good. As with other public goods, it is susceptible to free riding that risks the
formation and operation of the network. These risks cannot readily be over-
come in spiderless networks through conventional contractual solutions.
Thus, as we explain in the following sections, high transaction costs in the
formation of strategic alliances and other spiderless networks satisfy the
main condition for imposing a duty of restitution.
B. Liability for Ill-Gotten Benefits
The most developed part of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment
not only obliges wrongdoers to compensate victims for harms they suffered,
but also to disgorge to them the gains received at their expense. 84 Tradition-
" Pure public goods are characterized by the inability to exclude people from consuming
them ("non-excludability") and by the inability of one person's consumption to detract from or
prevent another person's consumption ("non-rivalry"). See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF
THE PUBLIc SECTOR 128-29 (3d ed. 2000). Whether the park is a pure public good or just
satisfies the non-excludability criterion is not relevant for our discussion.
82 There are several ways to reduce enforcement costs, including voting and licensing. In
addition, when the benefit is an increase in the market value of the beneficiaries' property, a
lien can be imposed on the property on behalf of the benefactor. Third party specialists could
purchase the lien for an immediate cash payment to the benefactor. See Porat, supra note 79, at
212.
83 For a detailed discussion of the conditions for expanding the duty of restitution to unre-
quested benefits cases, see id. at 194.
84 See generally supra note 72, §§ 40-46 (Restitution for Wrongs); 1 PALMER, supra note
75, §§ 2.1-2.20 (discussing acquisition of a benefit through a wrongful act).
[Vol. 824
2018] Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks?
ally, disgorgement is granted for intentional wrongs, such as trespass on
land." Suits for disgorgement of gains are also common in trademark and
copyright infringement cases; infringing trademarks thus risks liability based
on the infringer's ill-gotten gains rather than the harm suffered.86 Disgorge-
ment of gains is commonly awarded when one party makes use of another's
property without his consent. If the action were done with the other party's
consent, restitution law typically would not apply, since the transaction
would be considered consensual and governed by contract law. But under
certain circumstances, a party who begins performance of an illegal" or
other unenforceable agreement"8 is entitled to recover the benefits gained by
the counterparty89 (and in some other cases to recover for her reliance
losses90). In yet other cases, courts award quantum meruit, based either on an
implicit contract or unjust enrichment, when parties fail to agree on the fee
" See supra note 72, § 40 ("A person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or
conversion, by comparable interference with other protected interests in tangible property, or
in consequence of such an act by another, is liable in restitution to the victim of the wrong.");
Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936) (awarding disgorgement of profits for
commercial use of a cave extending under defendant's property); see also Olwell v. Nye &
Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946) (finding the wrongful user of an egg washing machine
liable to its owner for benefits derived from said usage). For an argument for disgorging gains
in accident cases, see Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Disgorgement Damages for Accidents, 44
J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2015).
86 See supra note 72, § 42 ("A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriation or in-
fringement of another's legally protected rights in any idea, expression, information, image, or
designation is liable in restitution to the holder of such rights."); see, e.g., Maier Brewing Co.
v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968) (ordering the disgorgement of
profits accrued from the sale of beer under the plaintiffs trade name).
" See supra note 72, § 32 ("A person who renders performance under an agreement that
is illegal or otherwise unenforceable for reasons of public policy may obtain restitution from
the recipient in accordance with the following rules . . . ."); see, e.g., Cohen v. Radio-Electron-
ics Officers Union, 679 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 1996) (awarding an attorney quantum meruit fee for
services rendered under a contract unenforceable for reasons of public policy). See generally
John W. Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L.
REv. 261 (1947) (surveying exceptions to the maxim that a plaintiff has no standing in court to
seek restitution in connection with an illegal transaction).
" See supra note 72, § 31 ("A person who renders performance under an agreement that
cannot be enforced against the recipient by reason of . . . indefiniteness . . . has a claim in
restitution against the recipient as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."); see, e.g.,
Montanaro Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Snow, 460 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1983) (remanding a case for
consideration of the extent to which landowners had been enriched by receiving the purchas-
ers' payments for an indefinite option agreement).
89 See supra note 72, § 31 cmt. i ("Restitution by the rule of this section is measured by
the value of the claimant's performance to the recipient."); see, e.g., Dursteler v. Dursteler, 697
P.2d 1244, 1248 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) ("Under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, parties to a
contract that fails to materialize may be required to pay restitution for the value of benefits
each has conferred and the other has unjustly retained.").
90 See, e.g., McCrowell v. Burson, 79 Va. 290 (1884) (allowing a plaintiff to recover for
expenditures in preparing to perform an oral contract to build a house for the defendant when
the defendant later refused to permit the plaintiff to undertake the actual work of construction);
Abrams v. Financial Serv. Co., 374 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1962) ("[U]nder proper
circumstances a vendor or lessor may recover for work and material expended on his own
property in reliance on a void or unenforceable contract for its sale or rental.").
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for specified personal services.91 Thus, restitution law sometimes applies as
well to incomplete consensual transactions and fills in gaps that the parties
left unattended.
The potential application of disgorgement doctrine to spiderless net-
works is straightforward. To see why, imagine that under certain conditions
the law recognized members' property rights in a network,92 so that a new
participant could share in network benefits only upon paying a fee based on
the expected benefits she receives and confers. Now assume that advance
permission for sharing the network's benefits is not feasible because the ben-
efit the new participant will receive or confer is uncertain, or negotiation
costs are prohibitively high. Under these circumstances, the best analogy is
the restitution cases discussed above where one party has received benefits
from another in an unenforceable agreement. 93 By analogy, the network
members could be seen as having implicitly agreed that the new member
could join the network for a fee proportionate to the expected benefits she
receives and confers, but because of high transaction costs, have failed to
agree on its amount in a fully binding contract. As in the cases of unenforce-
able agreements discussed above, here also restitution law could fill the gap
and allow network participants to recover from the new member an amount
sufficient to prevent unjust enrichment.9 4
C. A Restitution Model
The discussion thus far shows that spiderless networks have three cen-
tral features relevant to restitution law: first, parties confer benefits on others
without their consent; second, parties often "take" benefits from others
without their consent; and third, consent cannot be achieved in both cases
due to high transaction costs.
We now develop an informal model to show how the principles of resti-
tution law outlined above can be extended and applied to support the forma-
tion and operation of strategic alliances and other spiderless networks. To
' See supra note 72, § 31 cmt. e ("The measure of recovery in quantum meruit-whether
explained in terms of implied contract, unjust enrichment, or both-is the reasonable value of
the plaintiffs services."); see also Paffhausen v. Balano, 708 A.2d 269, 273 (Me. 1998) (ruling
that a carpenter who had received permission to renovate a building from its owner without
properly agreeing on a fee is entitled to recover for the reasonable value of labor and
materials).
2 Would the law allow network members any protection from third parties who injure the
network? That might also depend on the status of the network as creating IP-like rights, al-
though for such protection, much less than a property right is needed. Cf DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL
T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 1006-09 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing the liability for
an intentional interference with prospective business opportunity).
* See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
* As we explain in Part Ill, extending a disgorgement action to spiderless networks would
require common law courts first to recognize an appropriately limited right of recovery and
then to specify the proof conditions needed to overcome implementation concerns.
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clarify the analysis, we begin with several strong assumptions: (a) courts can
verify the costs and benefits of network participation and operation at rea-
sonable cost, and (b) the introduction of legal remedies to support efficient
networks complements the existing set of relational norms that maintain co-
operation and coordination among network members. We develop our model
by analyzing the most common circumstances when free riding and moral
hazard costs prevent efficient formation and operation of networks.
1. Case 1: Unilateral Creation of Benefits with Passive
Beneficiaries
Let's start with the case of the industrial district cluster we discussed in
Part I.19 Imagine that when the owner of an enterprise that is a magnet for
other firms ("the anchor") moves to the district, there are already a number
of smaller firms operating in the region that would expect to derive substan-
tial benefits from the presence of the anchor. Assume as well that there is a
substantial asymmetry of benefits conferred on each party in the district: the
anchor externalizes large benefits on the other firms, but receives few bene-
fits-or none-from them. Consequently, if the private benefits the anchor
expects to derive from relocation are less than its private costs, the anchor
may not move to the industrial district even when the total social benefits-
including the positive externalities conferred on the other firms-exceed the
anchor's private costs.96 To provide the anchor with efficient incentives to
relocate its facilities to the industrial district, it must be able to recoup at
least the difference between private costs and private benefits. A duty of
restitution imposed on the existing firms thus solves the free riding problem
that motivates the incumbent firms to decline to share in the costs of
relocation.
Network value would be further enhanced if the anchor (who receives
private benefits from the move) can recover from the incumbents all of its
relocation costs, making it better off as compared to its prior location. From
an efficiency perspective, the more benefits created by the network that are
internalized by the anchor, the more efficient are its incentives. Full internal-
" See supra Part I.A.2.
96 Parchomovsky and Siegelman have similarly noted that anchor stores may refrain from
moving to commercial districts due to their inability to internalize positive externalities. How-
ever, in contrast to our approach, they propose that cities use pubic law to create planned
commercial districts, analogous to suburban malls, which would allow for the capture of posi-
tive externalities among commercial establishments. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Sie-
gelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2012); see
also Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, 2014 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1373 (2015) (criticizing
Parchomovsky and Siegelman's suggested use of land use law and offering alternative proposi-
tions designed to optimize urban agglomerations). Fennell discusses the possibility raised by
Porat, supra note 79, of applying restitution law between benefactors and beneficiaries, but
deems it largely inapplicable, stating that "a more intricate system of payments for positive
and negative externalities could be imagined, although finding a workable way to administer it
would be highly challenging." Agglomerama, 2014 B.Y.U.L. REV. at 1406.
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ization of all the benefits created by the anchor provides it with efficient
incentives not only to relocate but also to operate within the network for the
benefit of all members. Furthermore, with full internalization of the benefits,
the benefactor would have efficient activity-level incentives, namely, to cre-
ate the potential for the creation of the benefits in the first place.97
To illustrate the advantages of full internalization of benefits in this
case, imagine that the anchor has to decide how to construct and operate its
enterprise once it moves to the new location. With full internalization of
benefits, the firm would take into account all the benefits, including those
conferred on others, in making investment decisions.98 However, if the
anchor recovers all the benefits externalized to the incumbents, then they
would not have efficient investment incentives. After all, their existence in
the industrial district is a "but-for" cause of the creation of the positive
externalities conferred upon them, and they also should invest under the as-
sumption that they will recoup the benefits they have generated either ac-
tively or passively. Therefore, given the budget constraint that does not
allow all parties who "cause" the benefits to fully internalize them, the pas-
sive enterprises properly should retain some of the benefits conferred by the
anchor.99
2. Case 2: Unilateral Creation of Benefits with Active Beneficiaries
Let's consider a variation to Case I and assume that no firms exist in
the geographic area, and that the owner of the anchor enterprise is expected
to attract small firms to locate nearby and form an industrial district once the
anchor relocates. We still assume that benefits are asymmetrical, namely,
that the anchor creates much more benefit for others than they create for it.
The difference between Case 1 and Case 2 is that in Case 2, it is clear
that the motivation for the smaller firms to join the network is the presence
of the anchor. This difference has several implications. First, assuming there
" A similar argument has been famously made in the context of tort law: a strict liability
rule-or full internalization of harms-is a better mechanism than a negligence rule to motivate
injurers to take efficient non-verifiable precautions and efficiently reduce their activity level.
See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUo. 1 (1980).
" For a similar argument in the context of shopping mall contracts, see Eric D. Gould et
al., Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls, 87 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 411,
419 (2005) (noting that "[e]xternalities are generated not only by the presence of certain
stores, but also by the actions that stores take, such as advertising, maintaining cleanliness,
courtesy, and product variety.. . . [T]he performance of all stores is affected by the ongoing
efforts of the developer, such as maintaining the right mix of stores, renovations, parking,
cleanliness, and marketing campaigns", and arguing that each actor should be provided with
incentives to undertake the right amount of such activities).
" This is how shopping center contracts internalize externalities. The developer gives the
anchor a portion of the externality created by the presence of the anchor, and then extracts
participation from non-anchor tenants through their lease terms. A contemporary example is
Amazon, which is itself a network, where the anchor tenant is paid by those who participate
and get the benefit of the participants that Amazon has drawn to a common space. We return to
this point in Part II.C.3, infra.
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is a duty of restitution obliging the smaller firms to compensate the anchor
for the benefits it confers, and assuming the amount of compensation is
known before the smaller firms relocate, the smaller firms cannot claim that
the duty of restitution makes them worse off. By choosing to relocate, they
have demonstrated that paying compensation in return for securing the bene-
fits of membership in the industrial district makes them better off in expecta-
tion. This argument does not apply in Case 1, where the smaller firms'
presence in the area implies nothing as to the amount of benefits they have
received from the anchor.
Second, a general objection to imposing liability for unrequested bene-
fits is that it infringes on the beneficiaries' autonomy: they are obliged to pay
for benefits that they have not agreed to purchase. ' Although there are sev-
eral responses to this objection, they do not apply to Case 2. By participating
in the network knowing that they are subject to a duty of restitution, the
smaller firms exhibit their willingness to receive the benefits of the network
and bear some of its costs.10 Third, in Case 2, more than in Case 1, network
success depends on allocating sufficient benefits to the smaller firms to in-
duce them to join the network. Since participating in the network is costly
for the smaller firms, they might decline to relocate unless they can capture
at least part of the benefits from participation in the industrial district--at a
minimum, they would require an amount sufficient to cover their relocation
costs.
3. Case 3: Multilateral Creation of Benefits
In Case 3, all members in a strategic alliance network confer benefits
on each other and the question is how to provide all members with efficient
incentives to participate in the network and function optimally in interac-
tions with other members. In the self-organizing setting of the strategic alli-
ance network, formation and maintenance often are not important until the
network matures.1 02 As this process continues, some firms are more success-
ful than others-there are winners and losers-and the winners may then
have a perverse incentive to exploit less successful firms and capture a
greater part of the externalities. In pursuing their own interests, successful
firms may not externalize sufficient benefits to the other members to make it
worthwhile for the latter to remain in the network. These self-interested ac-
'" See Porat, supra note 79, at 215-17; Friedmann, supra note 77, at 846-47; Scott Her-
showitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REv. 1147, 1168 (2006).
01 As noted above in Part II.B, joining an existing network might be considered analo-
gous to using someone's property following his consent but without agreeing on the amount of
the fee to be paid. This analogy will apply if the law recognizes a quasi-property right of
members in their networks. However, the argument is hardly relevant here where firms merely
located their facilities next to a cluster of enterprises on land they purchased or leased.
102 But in many circumstances even the decision to participate in a network entails costs,
as it requires firms to relocate as a precondition for participation. This is particularly true in the
case of clusters.
29
Harvard Business Law Review
tions will cause the network to fail unless the firms that have survived are
also motivated to "build" or "maintain" the network and operate efficiently
within it. To be sure, under some circumstances, permitting each member
simply to retain the benefits that are externalized by others without being
compensated for the benefits it externalizes will create efficient incentives to
participate in maintaining the network. For example, if there are six firms in
the network, and each confers 5 units of network value' 03 on others, receives
5 units of value in return and incurs participation costs of 3 units, each one
would have efficient incentives to participate in the network and legal inter-
vention would be unnecessary.
Things become more complicated, however, when (as is more likely)
some members' costs of participating in the network, including the opportu-
nity costs of not excluding less successful parties, are greater than the bene-
fits they receive, but less than the sum of the benefits they confer and
receive. To illustrate, assume that some firms confer 5 units of value on
others, receive benefits of 5 units from others, and bear 7 units of costs to
participate in the network. Although these firms create a net benefit of 3
units, they would not be motivated to participate in the network.
In the case just described, each firm's contribution to the network is
independent (Case 3.1), but in some cases, the contributions to network
functioning are complements: the contribution of all or some parties in par-
ticipating and maintaining the network is greater than the sum of the individ-
ual contributions of each one (Case 3.2). In yet other cases, the contributions
of network members are substitutes: only one party needs to expend costs to
maintain the network, and once the network functions all parties can freely
share the resulting benefits (Case 3.3).
Let's start with Case 3.3 where the contributions are substitutes. Here
the typical free riding problem arises: no single firm is motivated to cooper-
ate in ways that help to maintain the network, hoping that others will do so.
The problem would be acute if the costs of maintaining the network are
greater than any individual firm's private benefit. In such a case, no one has
an interest in maintaining the network unless compensated by others. Every
potential network member would instead be motivated to free ride, hoping
that others would compensate the first mover. A duty of restitution provides
a solution here as in Cases 1 and 2: the firm that acts to stabilize the network
would be awarded restitution for creating a public good that benefits all
participants. 10
One difference between Case 3.3 and Cases 1 and 2 is that in those
latter cases it was clear the magnet firm should be incentivized to form the
network. In contrast, in Case 3.3, any firm that actually acts to maintain the
1os We assume a "unit" is a universal measure of both network benefits and costs.
10 We ignore for the moment activity-level effects and incentives to efficiently operate
within the network once it is formed. See supra Part II.C.1.
05 See supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.
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network receives compensation. Another difference between the cases is the
amount of compensation for the party who acts to maintain the network.
Since by assumption any of the potential participants can expend costs to
maintain the network in Case 3.3, network benefits are enhanced if compen-
sation is designed to motivate action by the most efficient party. Thus, if
efficient network maintenance costs 5 units, the member who maintains the
network should receive 5 units in restitution (minus its relative share in the
costs as a member of the network) regardless of actual costs.o6 In contrast to
Cases 1 and 2, there is no reason in Case 3.3 to award damages greater than
reasonable (that is, efficient) costs to the firm that maintains the network
(minus its relative share in those costs), since those costs are the best mea-
sure of the benefits all participating firms have received, given the alterna-
tive ways to maintain the network. 0 7
Cases 3.1 and 3.2 are more complicated. Ideally, each firm should inter-
nalize all the benefits it creates. With full internalization all firms will make
efficient investment decisions whether to participate and how best to operate
in the network, and their activity levels also will be efficient.," However,
absent a state decision to subsidize all parties that create positive externali-
ties, full internalization is impossible.'0 The second best solution is for each
firm whose costs are higher than the benefits it receives from the network
("losing firm") to recover from other participants ("winning firms") the
lesser of (a) the difference between the losing firm's reasonable costs of par-
ticipating in the network (Cr) and the benefits it received (Bij), or (b) the
benefits the losing firm confers on other members (Bex). Thus, in our exam-
ple, where each losing firm reasonably spent 7 units participating in the net-
work, received a benefit of 5 units and conferred a benefit of 5 units, any
losing firm would be entitled to reimbursement of at least 2 units from the
winning firms. Encouraging the losing firm to participate in the network,
however, also requires a modest premium above Cr-Bin: otherwise the firm
would be indifferent between participation and non-participation.
Interestingly, in cases where there is an upper limit on network mem-
bership, and when C,-Bin< Bx (as in our previous numerical example), C,-
Bin, rather than Bx, is the best way to measure the benefit the losing firm
conferred upon others. To understand why, assume that there are many po-
106 We assume that all networks yield the same benefits once formed and stabilized. Other-
wise, compensation would need to be adapted to account also for subsequent deficiencies in
the operation of the network.
"o7 One could also imagine that with Cases 1 and 2 that there was competition over which
magnet enterprise would relocate its business operations to the proposed cluster, and if the
firm that actually relocated had not done so, other magnet enterprises would have acted to
relocate. In such case, the benefits to other firms might be the costs of relocation rather than
the positive externalities they can capture.
10s But see Part II.B.
* Full subsidies to all participants would provide them with efficient incentives assuming
they do not collude; indeed, with such subsidies firms do have strong incentives to collude and
create excessive benefits.
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tential losing firms with the same expected participation costs and benefits
that compete in maintaining the network and are motivated to participate if
awarded slightly more than Cr-Bin. Under those circumstances, the minimum
payment necessary to induce a losing firm to participate in the network ade-
quately represents the benefit conferred upon members from the losing
firm's participation.110
Damages in the amount of Cr-Bin is consistent with other solutions pro-
vided by restitution law for analogous cases. In most cases where the law
allows benefactors to receive reimbursement for unrequested benefits, the
measure of recovery is the reasonable (net) costs incurred rather than the
benefits conferred, as long as the former is lower than the latter. II There are
several justifications for limiting recovery to reasonable costs incurred, in-
cluding the goal of avoiding the over-production of benefits due to over-
evaluation" 2 or analogous moral hazard risks."' But another plausible expla-
nation is the one we have proposed here: when more than one person can
serve as the benefactor, the benefit conferred by the benefactor is worth no
more than the payment necessary to induce the next person in line to confer
that same benefit.
4. Case 4: Increasing (or Decreasing) Costs of Joining the Network
Consider again the industrial district example we discussed in Case 1.
Imagine that there are six potential firms in the network and each confers 5
units of value on the other firms and receives 5 units of value from the
others. Here, however, the costs of joining the network increase as additional
firms join the network (although six is the upper limit): the first mover's cost
of participation is 2 units, the second firm's cost is 3 units, and so on. Thus,
total expected costs are 27 units and total expected benefits are 30 units for a
net benefit of 3 units. These increased costs could stem from a variety of
sources. Initial infrastructure investments, such as real estate and labor costs,
for example, may be less costly at the outset and increase as the cluster
grows. Thus, firms joining the cluster later will face higher costs.114
"o See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 A (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (measur-
ing restitution by "[tihe reasonable value to the other party of what he received in terms of
what it would have cost him to obtain it from a person in the claimant's position"); SEE SUPRA
note 72, § 49(2) ("Enrichment from a money payment is measured by the amount of the
payment or the resulting increase in the defendant's net assets, whichever is less.").
112 Levmore, supra note 73, at 69-72; Porat, supra note 79, at 209-10.
"' Cf William Landes & Richard Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 83, 91-93 (1978) (argu-
ing that prizes for rescue might encourage excessive investments in rescue operations); Saul
Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of
Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 886-89 (1986) (arguing that prizes for rescue
motivate potential rescuers to put potential rescuees under peril in order to rescue them and
win the prize).
' See, e.g., the discussion of the Silicon Valley cluster infra Part I.A. To be sure, as
noted in the text, the reverse could also arise where costs of participation decrease over time.
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Facilitating the formation of a network when costs of joining the net-
work either increase or decrease over time requires that all participating
firms receive a share in the network's surplus proportionate to the benefits
they create for others and the costs they have incurred. Since, in our exam-
ple, all member firms receive and confer the same benefits, sharing costs
equally would be the optimal solution."' Otherwise, the network would fail
to mature because later movers would abandon-or be excluded from-the
cluster.
Alternatively, if the change in costs were reversed and early parties
faced higher costs than later arrivals-for example, because of the greater
risk of losing their initial investment if the network fails to function-the
cluster might fail to form at all. In this case, even if the first mover's costs
were lower than benefits, but still higher than the costs of the next firms to
join the network, no firm would volunteer to be the first mover, hoping to
free ride and reap more benefits from later participation. Only an equal shar-
ing in costs-or even a bonus for the first firms to join-ean solve this partic-
ular free riding problem.
5. Allocating the Network's Surplus
In all the cases discussed above, potential network members should be
reimbursed by others in order to motivate them to participate in or maintain
the network. The legal justification for reimbursement is the value to the
network of approximating a reciprocity equilibrium: some members either
conferred uncompensated benefits on others and should recover from
them,"' or instead took benefits from others and should pay for them.11 7 The
question that arises is what happens after each losing party is paid for the
difference between her costs and benefits (Cr-Bi,): How should the network
surplus be allocated among the participating firms? Ideally, the law would
provide more benefits to those firms that can either affect the level of posi-
tive externalities they create more than others or are more susceptible to
activity level effects. But this capability or susceptibility is often impossible
to identify, especially when creation of benefits is multilateral.
In the alternative, a reciprocity equilibrium can be maintained by allo-
cating the network's surplus according to the net benefits received and bene-
fits conferred. This is justified by fairness considerations (the more benefits
you confer, the larger share of the surplus you get), but even more impor-
tantly, it functions better as a default rule for network members, encouraging
For example, perhaps the risk to first movers is higher since there is some likelihood that the
network will fail before its formation is stabilized.
"5 Although in our example, each firm receives and confers the same units of benefit, that
does not imply that total benefits remain unchanged over time. For the cluster to succeed, total
benefits should increase as costs increase.
116 See supra Part H.A. 1. (discussing the unrequested benefits cases).
"' See supra Part 1I.B., at 25-26 (the disgorgement of gains cases).
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them to regulate their network relationships through contract." More specif-
ically, when contributions are independent,"9 each member is entitled to half
of the sum of the net benefits received and the benefits conferred.1 20 This is a
Nash bargaining solution, and as such it represents the most plausible divi-
sion of the surplus the parties would have made if they could have reached
an agreement.121
To illustrate this solution, assume there are six firms in the network,
three firms each receive a net benefit of 1 unit of value and confer benefits
of 5 units (A members), while the other three each receive a net benefit of 5
units and confer benefits of I unit (B members). The total benefit generated
by the network is 18 units. Take the A members first: Each firm is entitled to
3 units (half of the sum of the net benefits received and the benefits con-
ferred). Since A members already receive 1 unit, they should recover 2 units
in restitution. Consider now the B members: Each firm is also entitled to 3
units. Since B members have received 5 units, they should pay 2 units to the
A members. In this example, all network members will receive the same
share of the gains from the network. Of course, this is not always so. As-
sume, for example, that one firm confers 18 units of benefit and receives
nothing, another firm receives 10 units of benefit and confers nothing, and
the four other firms receive 2 units of benefit each, and confer nothing. Here,
the first firm is entitled to recover 9 units (5 from the firm that received 10
units, and 1 unit from each of the other four that received 2 units).
Note that network members sometimes should be denied any sharing in
the surplus. Assume there is an upper bound on the size of the network and
there are enough candidates who are willing to participate. In such a case, if
existing members had not joined the network, someone else would have
joined in their place. Assuming also that the court knows these facts, there is
a good reason not to allow existing members to recover more than Cr-Bin:
although their presence in the network would have created benefits, those
"' Contracting in this context includes the full array of controlling mechanisms, from
creating master contracts to the bureaucratic structures common in co-ops and trade
associations.
"' See supra Part II.C.3., at 31 (Case 3.1).
120 When contributions are complements, see supra Part II.C.3., at 31 (Case 3.2), the allo-
cation would still be according to the net benefits received and benefits conferred but would
leave each member less than half of the sum of the net benefits received and the benefits
conferred. To see why, imagine a network of three members, creating together a total net
benefit of 18 units, equally shared by them (that is, each receives a net benefit of 6 units). Let's
assume now that each member's contribution is a "but for" cause of the entire benefits of 18
units (full complements). Obviously, a Nash bargaining solution would yield each member 6
units, as it naturally happens in our example. 6 units, of course, is less than half of the sum of
benefits received (6 units) and conferred (12 units).
121 Assuming similar utility functions, players in a Nash bargaining situation are expected
to come to a resolution that splits the surplus evenly among them. Guillermo Owen, Game
Theory, in 9 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE Soc. & BEHAV. Sci. 573, 578-80 (James D. Wright
ed., 2d ed. 2015). The Nash bargaining solution is predicated upon four axioms. Assuming
similar utility functions, the outcome which satisfies all axioms is one in which the parties
divide the surplus evenly. Id. at 578.
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benefits would have been created without them. Nonetheless, awarding them
Cr-Bin is essential, since otherwise neither they nor their substitutes will par-
ticipate in the network. Note, however, that when those members could af-
fect the benefits conferred on others (namely, they are active rather than
passive), leaving them with at least part of the network surplus might im-
prove their incentives to maximize the surplus.
6. Negative Externalities
Networks can create negative externalities, side by side with positive
externalities. Thus, in the case of a cluster of industrial firms, although many
firms would receive benefits from the magnet firm, other firms in the area
might suffer harms. One might imagine two types of harms that result from
the development of an industrial district: (1) driving out the non-network
businesses in the area, and (2) increasing the cost of entry to non-network
firms that locate in or near the cluster. To properly motivate all parties, both
positive and negative externalities should count. How should they count?
First, some or all network members might be required to compensate
victims for harm suffered. Those harms should count as costs and be taken
into account in calculating the recovery the firm is entitled to or the pay-
ments it should make to other members. Second, even without liability for
harms, when accounting for negative externalities, courts applying a restitu-
tion regime should tailor the remedies among the network members. For
example, if, as in Cases 1 and 2, the magnet firm creates negative externali-
ties together with the positive externalities, its recovery against the other
firms is reduced, with the limit of the difference between positive and nega-
tive externalities.1 22
7. Summary
The restitution model developed above supports the following
propositions:
First, the operation of a spiderless network is efficiently sup-
ported where each firm in the network is allowed to capture all of
the benefits its participation in the network creates for the firm and
others. Full internalization of benefits provides each network
member efficient incentives to participate in maintaining the net-
work and to make efficient investment decisions before and after
its decision to participate.
Second, since restitution law by itself cannot effect full inter-
nalization by each network member, the model supports restitution
122 See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1450-52 (2007)
(warning of the risk of allowing actors to recover for their positive externalities and using the
recoveries for compensating for negative externalities).
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remedies that best approximate a reciprocity equilibrium where the
network surplus is divided among firms according to each mem-
ber's net benefits received and benefits conferred.
Third, where there are impediments to achieving a reciprocity
equilibrium, the model supports permitting each firm whose par-
ticipation in the network is efficient to retain (and, if necessary, to
recover) benefits sufficient to ensure its participation.
Fourth, variance in the costs of participating in the network
are relevant in decisions allocating costs and benefits, as costs may
differ over time such that early (later) participation that is more
costly than later (earlier) participation may deter network forma-
tion and functioning.
Fifth, the presence of magnet enterprises whose incentives to
operate within the network have disproportionately greater influ-
ence on efficient network formation justifies a differential alloca-
tion of costs and benefits.
In this Part, we have proposed a model in a friction-free environment
that applies restitution remedies to a range of cases where free riding and
moral hazard costs create asymmetries in the distribution of net benefits
from network participation. In the following Part we relax the strong as-
sumptions of the model, evaluate the utility of restitution remedies in a more
realistic setting, and suggest how extending a right of restitution to members
of spiderless networks in certain circumstances can enhance the welfare
gains from the increasing trust and cooperation that results from participa-
tion in the network.
III. IMPLEMENTING A RESTITUTION REGIME
The preceding analysis has identified both the fragility of many
spiderless networks and demonstrated how restitution remedies have the po-
tential of approximating a reciprocity equilibrium that contributes to effi-
cient network functioning. In adjusting and tailoring the quantum of
restitution damages in any particular case, the goal is to balance the high
costs of verifying network costs and benefits against the goal of sufficient
internalization to improve network performance. That objective argues in
most cases for a low-powered remedial scheme, one that applies the mini-
mum remedy necessary to deter the self-interested actions that impair the
mutual trust and cooperation essential to the efficient operation of spiderless
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networks.1 23 This means that in most cases, network members could seek to
recover from other members no more than the difference between their costs
of participating in the network and the benefits they received from it. 124
In this Part, we illustrate how such a scheme of narrowly tailored resti-
tution remedies can function successfully in real world spiderless networks.
Part III.A. considers whether and how a limited restitution duty would apply
in the case of the four exemplars of uncompensated externalities described in
Part I. In Part III.B., we then show how these low-powered restitution reme-
dies can work as complements to the informal norms that currently govern
network relationships. Part III.C. takes up some of the objections to author-
izing common law courts to entertain even a limited right of restitution for
firms in spiderless networks. We conclude in Part III.D. that even if a claim
for restitution by one network firm against another is rarely successful, by
specifying the parameters of a claim, the law can function as a bargain-
enabling default (a virtual spider as it were) that encourages parties in
spiderless networks to coordinate around contractual mechanisms that pro-
mote network reciprocity.
A. Applying Low-Powered Restitution Remedies to the Four Exemplars
1. Magnet Firms and Late Arrivals
The general case of magnet firms was analyzed in detail in Part II, so
here we focus specifically on the Silicon Valley case.12 5 The question is what
should happen when a research institute (like Stanford University), several
computer technology related firms, and venture capitalists attract startup
companies to relocate in their vicinity, thereby allowing them to capture
many benefits, for which they don't pay. The Silicon Valley case is close to
Case 2 in the restitution model (unilateral creation of benefits with active
beneficiaries),1 26 where a magnet firm attracts many other entities to relocate
123 Adopting a minimal or low-powered remedial scheme furthers another goal: to reduce
chilling and crowding out effects, as we explain in detail in Part IHl.B.
124 To be clear, some extension of common law restitution doctrine is required to imple-
ment any regime of restitution remedies for spiderless networks. As we have explained, our
normative argument is grounded in two fundamental tenets of restitution law: (1) under certain
conditions a party who voluntarily confers benefits upon others can recover the value of those
benefits from the beneficiaries; and (2) a party who takes value belonging to others without
reciprocating in kind must pay for the benefits she received. To apply these tenets to spiderless
networks, common law courts must extend existing law to specific instances of opportunistic
behavior that threaten network cooperation. In doing so, courts disposed to extend restitution
remedies to network members that suffer moral hazard or free riding costs must, of necessity,
consider a number of implementation issues beyond the scope of this paper, such as whether
damages should be awarded ex ante (for potential benefits) or ex post (for realized benefits),
how the burdens of proof should be allocated among the parties, and how best to assess restitu-
tion claims.
125 See supra Part I.C..
126 See supra Part II.C.2.
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nearby and form a cluster network. In such cases, there is an efficiency justi-
fication for allowing the magnet enterprise-er other core members that gen-
erate substantial externalities-to capture a substantial portion of the
network's surplus and, in any event, at least recover the difference between
costs and benefits. The question then is whether Stanford University in our
example, as well as other magnet firms that "established" the Silicon Valley
network, received enough of the network's surplus.
Answering that particular case requires more facts, but consider how
the restitution regime would work in similar cases whenever a research insti-
tute ("RI") considers bringing a claim against other network members, say a
startup firm that allegedly captured uncompensated benefits from the RI. At
the outset, the RI must show that both firms belong to the same network,
namely, that there were repeated interactions between the parties, that they
engaged in interrelated business activities, and that the RI conferred benefits
on the startup firm (or that the startup "took" benefits from the RI). It is
likely that the RI participates in more than one network: it might produce
information regarding the biological foundation of various drug therapies to
which particular startup enterprises benefitted and also produce information
relating to the development of new computing technologies with benefits
accruing to other startup firms.
Next, the RI would need to show that it generated information that dif-
fused throughout the network-say, information about network partners ca-
pable of collaborating on developing a particular drug therapy-4hat was
"used" by the defendant startup, perhaps with the participation of other net-
work firms, in developing relationships that resulted in a new drug. The RI
would then be entitled to show how much it invested in research capabilities
to build these successful partnerships, including the costs of manpower,
materials, and laboratory facilities-as against any corresponding benefits
(say, from grants, tuition revenues, patents, and enhanced charitable contri-
butions). If the court finds that benefits are lower than costs, it may award
the RI the defendant's share of the difference, or an approximation of it, as
restitution damages.127 And if the RI can prove it is a magnet firm, the resti-
tution regime contemplates a more generous recovery above net costs (and
even if the magnet's benefits clearly exceed its costs).
The Silicon Valley case raises the additional problem of late arrivals
similar to Case 4 in the model (increasing costs of joining the network).
Here, firms that are willing to join the network at a later stage may face
higher costs relative to earlier arriving firms. How are late arrivals en-
couraged to join the cluster rather than move to another location? First, a
startup that arrives later and subsequently realizes benefits from the network
would be entitled (with an ex post remedy) to offset higher costs attributable
127 In theory, all beneficiary firms in the network are liable for a portion of the restitution
damages according to their share in the network's surplus. Thus, the court would need to esti-
mate that share with respect to the defendant firm.
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to late entry against any future liability in restitution brought by other cluster
members to recover uncompensated benefits. Furthermore, if its participa-
tion costs exceed its benefits, the late-arriving firm would be entitled to
recoup the difference from firms that realized net benefits from the network.
This solution is inadequate, however, in a case where every firm incurs
a net benefit. Here, it is tempting to consider awarding ex ante damages
equal to the difference between early and late arrival costs. This option,
however, begs the question how those incremental costs are to be allocated
among other network members, especially when it is unclear who, if anyone,
is an ex post beneficiary. Given this problem, ex post compensation is the
preferable solution, permitting firms that create ex post benefits for network
members to recoup the incremental cost of late arrival, even if their benefits
exceed their costs. Damages for the incremental cost of late arrival would
then be allocated among network members in the same way a losing mem-
ber's net costs are allocated. 12 8
2. Free Riding on Indirect Ties
In the Apple-Sony case, 129 Sony indirectly acquired information from
IBM which Sony and Apple then used to develop the laptop computer and to
advance Sony's business interests in consumer electronics. Thus, in the net-
work composed, in part, of Apple, Sony, and IBM, IBM conferred benefits
on upon both Apple and Sony, but only had an alliance contract with Apple.
The question then arises: Is IBM entitled to restitution damages for the un-
compensated network benefits it conferred on Sony? We assume that neither
Sony nor Apple committed a justiciable wrong, as the information that Sony
derived from IBM was not protected by IP law,130 and we further assume that
Apple was not in breach of its contract with IBM. Indeed, it is common in
strategic alliance networks for one party to acquire information from a con-
tract partner that has been acquired by the contract partner in collaboration
with third parties.
One way to approach the problem is through the traditional tools of
contract law. The contract between IBM and Apple arguably accounted for
the possibility of information being made available to Sony (or other third
parties) and the alliance contract was priced accordingly. Relying on the
alliance contract to internalize the subsequent benefits to third parties is sub-
optimal, however. Not only do the contracting parties face substantial uncer-
tainty at the time of contract, which makes pricing a formidable task, but ex
ante pricing also provides the party possessing the information inadequate
incentives to share it with the counterparty, knowing the information might
later be used in alliances between the counterparty and third parties. Thus, if
'2 See supra Part II.C.3.
12 See supra Part I.C.2.
130 We assume the information is "know-how" that is not subject to property right
protection.
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IBM has been paid ex ante for the subsequent use of its private information
by Apple and Sony, IBM would fail to consider any future benefits that
Sony-or Sony's counterparts-might derive from that information in decid-
ing what information to share in its alliance contract with Apple and what
information to withhold.
An alternative solution is to realize that IBM, Apple, and Sony are part
of a strategic alliance network in which IBM conferred substantial network
benefits on Apple and Sony but potentially received fewer benefits in return.
Thus, the Apple-Sony case is a variation of our Case 3.2 (multilateral crea-
tion of benefits where contributions to network functioning are comple-
ments).' 3 ' An award of restitution damages to IBM gives parties in IBM's
position an incentive to share information with alliance partners, like Apple,
even if they appreciate the risk that the information will ultimately be used
by third party competitors, like Sony.
But how could restitution remedies be implemented in a case like this?
We assume that all three parties' efforts and expertise combined and resulted
in the development and manufacturing of the new laptops and more innova-
tive consumer electronics and that IBM did not receive any compensating
benefits. Hence, IBM could seek to recover restitution damages from Sony
and Apple. The court would need to estimate IBM's contribution to the new
laptops and consumer electronics produced by Sony and Apple, respectively,
and determine the percentage of the profits made by Sony or Apple that
should be attributed to information generated by IBM. From that percentage,
the court could determine the quantum of damages to award to IBM. Consis-
tent with the imposition of low-powered restitution remedies, however, a
court would need to be appropriately cautious to avoid awarding damages
that are higher than IBM's true contribution to the realized profits. Any un-
certainty would properly be resolved in Sony's (and Apple's) favor in order
to reduce any chilling effects on entrepreneurs who might fear that some of
the profit they realize from innovation may subsequently be attributed to
information derived indirectly from other network participants.
3. Exploiting "Structural Holes"
In the Tata Group case,13 2 one large Indian firm uses valuable informa-
tion it received from smaller Indian firms for its own benefit. The difficult
question is whether the smaller firms should be entitled to some of the net-
work's surplus that currently is captured mostly by Tata. If Tata is a magnet
enterprise, as in Case 2 in the model,' allowing it to retain a large portion
of the network surplus is the right solution. In this way, Tata would secure an
appropriate return from sharing its reputational benefits with other network
131 See supra Part II.C.3.
132 See supra Part I.C.3.
1' See supra Part II.C.2.
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members. When Tata is allowed to capture the greater part of network bene-
fits, it is motivated to make more efficient decisions regarding the network's
operation and composition than if it had to disgorge a substantial portion of
its profits.
At the same time, however, not allowing the smaller Indian firms any
share in the network surplus above what they receive from their mere partic-
ipation in alliances with foreign entities is likely to deter some of those firms
from participating in the network. This destabilizing result would occur
when these firms determined that the expected costs of participation-in par-
ticular, the costs of disclosing valuable private information to Tata that could
adversely affect their business opportunities-would be prohibitive.
The fact that Tata is a magnet firm, together with the need to attract the
small Indian firms to participate in the network, argues for limiting any
claim against Tata to the amount of net costs incurred by any one of the
smaller firms (C,-Bin), plus a modest premium. Most of the network surplus
should remain with Tata, but the smaller firms' incentives to join the network
would increase. Indeed, in theory, it might be appropriate to allow Tata to
recover from the subset of smaller firms who benefitted significantly
through the network. Assuming, however, that Tata's positional monopoly
has permitted it to capture rents, it is doubtful whether this solution is justi-
fied given the difficulties of proof.
The Tata case might be difficult to resolve unless an expert tribunal,
such as the Delaware Chancery Court, had jurisdiction to hear restitution
claims in spiderless networks. An expert tribunal can more readily sort the
complex interaction between the benefits properly attributable to Tata's posi-
tion in the network as the reputational intermediary from the rents that are
attributable to its positional monopoly. Moreover, this case is an appropriate
one for an information revelation mechanism: the emerging doctrine could
develop a rule that any firm that joined the network after a fee request from a
central firm such as Tata is deemed to have accepted a legally binding offer,
thus making any subsequent restitution claims redundant.
4. Exploiting Informational Synergies
In the Microsoft case,13 4 one large firm has many strategic alliances
and, as a consequence of its central position in the network, can exploit
informational synergies to capture a larger share of the future projects avail-
able to network members. The knowledge and expertise in pursuing future
business opportunities resulting from this synergy of information is not
traceable to any other network member or alliance partner. Should
Microsoft's alliance partners share in the gains obtained by Microsoft?
The problem this case poses for imposing a restitution remedy is that it
is especially difficult to measure the contribution of any given network
134 See supra Part I.C.4.
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member or alliance partner to the gains made by Microsoft at a later stage.
At the same time, however, some firms are reluctant to do business with
Microsoft because they fear being "exploited."' 35 Thus, the Microsoft case is
similar to Case 3.2 in the restitution model (multilateral creation of benefits
when contributions are complements), 3 6 but with the complication that one
firm-Microsoft-might also be a magnet enterprise, similar to Case 2."1 In
such cases, leaving some of the network surplus to the peripheral firms, in
addition to what they would receive by their participation in the network, is
a plausible solution that would motivate more firms to participate fully in
sharing private information with others, and with the centrally embedded
firm in particular.
But the question remains: Can the measurement and evaluation
problems this case poses be overcome? As long as the legal objective is
modest, a limited restitution remedy would improve internalization of net-
work benefits. This argues for reimbursing the verifiable net costs (Cr-Bin) of
Microsoft's alliance partners, plus a fixed premium. Moreover, if the C,-Bin
value is not verifiable, a court motivated to support spiderless networks has
available the alternative suggested above for the Sony-Apple exemplar:
Once Microsoft realizes substantive benefits from a new product and the
plaintiff can show that its extra-contractual private information was used by
Microsoft in developing the new product, the plaintiff is eligible to recover
damages measured by the relative contribution of the plaintiff's information
to the development of the new product.
B. Crowding Out and Chilling Effects
1. The Crowding Out Problem
The preceding analysis suggests that when evaluation problems are
tractable, access to a restitution remedy can potentially ameliorate the moral
hazard, free riding, and other transaction cost impediments to network sur-
vival.' But introducing a potential legal sanction raises a further challenge
to the extension of restitution remedies to the network setting: Would these
legal remedies crowd out the informal, relational forces that appear to work
well in some spiderless networks?
Theory suggests that cooperating parties should aim to capture the ben-
efits of both formal and informal enforcement of reciprocity norms by rely-
ing on formal legal remedies to solve complex problems with noisy
interactions and on informal methods (whether grounded in reputation, re-
peated interaction, or reciprocity) to enforce contingencies that are difficult
'" See supra text accompanying note 42.
136 See supra text accompanying note 104.
... See supra Part II.C.2.
38 For examples of moral hazard and free riding problems in a variety of networks, see
supra Parts I.C.1-4.
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to verify but clear enough to be observable.'39 A mixed strategy is feasible if
formal and informal enforcement regimes can be complements, but not if
they are substitutes where recourse to formality "crowds out" the operation
of informality. Here, existing theory and evidence offer limited guidance.
Experimental research has demonstrated that, in some instances, formal
sanctions do crowd out informal mechanisms.'4 But the fact that formal and
informal means of enforcing reciprocal relationships are potentially rivalrous
does not mean that a mixed strategy is necessarily inferior or impossible.1 4 1
How, then, do formal legal obligations to abide by a normative com-
mand interact with compliance based on trust and reciprocity? One of us has
argued in an earlier paper that crowding out occurs when the legal sanction
"degrade[s] the information about the nature of the counterparties and the
[cooperative] nature of their interactions." 42 First, consider the effects of
introducing a legal sanction on how the participants perceive the nature of
their interaction. The most familiar example is the experiment using formal
sanctions to cause parents to pick up their children from day care on time. To
improve punctuality, a fine was imposed for tardiness. The perverse result
was an increase in late pickups because the formal fine "crowded out" the
reputation-based norm.14 Tardy behavior was no longer considered a breach
of a moral obligation; it was transformed into a market transaction in which
a parent had the "right" to pay for delay and thus felt unconstrained by
being tardy.
A second factor contributing to the crowding out effect is the impact of
formal legal sanctions on the frequency or incidence of the cooperative be-
havior that supports relational norms. When legal sanctions are keyed to all
outcome variables, a "high-powered" legal sanction suppresses the produc-
tion of information that supports reciprocity.'" The effect of high-powered
"' See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 23, at 1386, 1398-99 ("When outcomes can be
verified by courts empowered to compel disclosure of relevant information, formal contracts
are preferred; where outcomes are hard to characterize, and therefore difficult to verify, but the
activity is observable to the parties, informal contracts are feasible.").
140 See, e.g., Daniel Houser, Erte Xiao, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, When Punish-
ment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation, 62 GAMES & EcON.
BEHAV. 509 (2008); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Volun-
tary Cooperation?, (Univ. of Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No.
34, 2000); sources cited infra note 143.
141 Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the
Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 551, 579-80 (2004).
142 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 23, at 1399 (emphasis added).
143 See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (2000). For
an extensive literature in social psychology that also considers the crowding out of intrinsic
motivations, see Edward L. Deci, R. Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivations, 125
Psychol. Bull. 627 (1999).
'" High powered enforcement consists in the imposition of standard legal remedies for
failure to perform specified contractual obligations. Enforcement is tied to outcome variables
and provides incentives for parties to take specified actions to maximize expected surplus. In
contrast, low powered enforcement consists in imposing sanctions only for the verifiable fail-
ures to reciprocate, but not for the failure of the parties to invest sufficiently in the underlying
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sanctions is to increase the consequences of non-compliance: The threat of a
severe sanction leads parties to share less information about their desire to
make cooperative adjustments to the relationship. Thus, parties facing high-
powered sanctions for non-compliance communicate less about the problems
they are experiencing and consequently have fewer opportunities to make
mutually beneficial reciprocal adjustments over time. In a sense, high-pow-
ered legal enforcement intended to create efficient incentives to perform
specified actions functions as a "first strike" nuclear weapon, where each
party continually faces the risk that a single misstep can transform a surplus-
generating cooperative enterprise into a zero-sum game. 145
Given the crowding out risk, courts concerned to preserve complemen-
tarity in spiderless networks should be motivated to impose low-powered
remedies designed to encourage compliance with the information exchange
regime, and the informal relations it supports, while avoiding the high-pow-
ered sanctions that incentivize the behavior that crowds out informality. 4 6 In
this way, legal sanctions would be applied only to those actions that are
critical to maintaining and supporting the formation and operation of the
network.
Moreover, crowding out in this context is unlikely in any event because
the normative structure of business networks is parsimonious. There is no
norm of altruism among business firms. No firm is implicitly obligated to
cooperate with other network members and produce value for them, even if
the cooperating member loses value. There is also no norm of risk sharing
among network members who are not in a direct contractual relationship. A
firm that gains benefits from the network has no implicit obligation to com-
pensate a firm that cooperated with others in the network but incurred net
losses. In sum, the low-powered legal remedy contemplated by imposing a
duty of restitution cannot crowd out altruism and risk sharing norms for the
simple reason that those norms do not exist in a spiderless business network.
To be sure, there are network norms of reciprocity and cooperation but, as
we have argued and as the experimental data support, a low-powered restitu-
tion remedy is most likely to complement rather than to substitute for those
existing norms. 147
business activity so as to yield particular outcomes. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 23,
at 1399.
14 The threat of the ultimate sanction thus deters parties from voluntarily revealing the
information needed for the counterparty to adjust informally. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra
note 23, at 1399-401, citing Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967, 1013-15 (1983).
146 See supra note 144.
147 The experimental data suggests that informal norms and legal remedies are comple-
ments when each strategy reinforces the effectiveness of the other. See Sergio Lazzarini, Gary
J. Miller & Todd R. Zenger, Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of
Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 261 (2004); Mary Rigdon, Trust
and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting, 70 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 93 (2009). Thus, a legal
sanction that covers some but not all of the parties' obligations complements existing norms if
the remaining obligations can be enforced informally. Furthermore, the reciprocity equilib-
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2. Chilling Effects
Liability sometimes chills desirable activities. In tort law, judicial errors
cause chilling effects when injurers expect liability even for benign behav-
iors.1 48 The risk of liability might encourage them inefficiently to reduce
their activity level. Would the restitution duties outlined above chill desira-
ble activities?
Consider Case 2 in the restitution model (unilateral creation of benefits
with active beneficiaries).1 49 Here, a magnet firm relocates and small firms
consider moving to its vicinity in order to capture positive externalities pro-
duced by the magnet firm. Assume that those firms are exposed to liability
risks under a restitution regime. They might anticipate that error costs will
lead to liability in restitution that exceeds the benefits they expect to capture
from the magnet firm. As a consequence, the small firms may elect not to
relocate even when relocation is efficient. In contrast, in the absence of ex-
pected liability, the firms would relocate in order to capture positive network
benefits from the magnet firm.
There are several reasons why this risk of chilling effects should not
lead a court to reject a claim for restitution. First, in a world without legal
remedies there are offsetting efficiency losses caused by large-scale exter-
nalities that threaten the viability of a spiderless network. Without a mecha-
nism to internalize the externalities, for example, a magnet firm may choose
not to relocate to an emerging industrial district and no network will be
formed, or, even if it did relocate, the network would not function to maxi-
mize the entire network surplus. Second, chilling effects are reduced when
sanctions are low-powered. In the magnet firm cases (Cases 1 and 2 in the
model), the magnet firm recovers less than the entire benefits it created for
the others. Any chilling effect is reduced, as smaller firms anticipate retain-
ing measurable benefits. Third, chilling effects might be reduced with an ex
ante remedy. With such a remedy, each firm would be able to know at an
early stage, even before joining the network, the approximate liability-or
entitlement-it might bear and decide accordingly whether or not to join.
And finally, firms can engage in standard risk management techniques until
insurance markets evolve to reduce the variance in liability caused by high
rates of error.
rium, if achieved, might stabilize existing networks and make their operation more efficient. In
this way, restitution might create a new norm of fairer, and more efficient, sharing of networks'
surplus, according to each member's contribution. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Impor-
tance of Being Earnest: Two Notions of Internalization, 65 U. ToRoNiro L.J. 37, 59 (2015)
(arguing that mild sanction is likely to reinforce voluntary compliance).
148 Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67
STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1304-10 (2015) (arguing that chilling effects should be a major concern
in setting standards of proof).
1' See supra Part I.C.2.
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C. Further Objections
1. Governmental Intervention
A possible objection to extending restitution remedies to spiderless net-
works is that there are more effective ways to solve the moral hazard and
free riding problems we have identified. Thus, for example, the state might
better solve the problem through a scheme of taxes and subsidies. Particu-
larly in the case of clusters of industrial districts, local authorities could
serve as a spider: they could levy taxes on firms who create negative exter-
nalities, or who internalize more benefits from the network than what they
externalize to other firms, and subsidize firms that externalize more benefits
than they internalize.5 0 Local authorities can also use their governmental
powers to organize industrial districts in a way that approximates a reciproc-
ity equilibrium.'
To be sure, extending the common law of restitution to spiderless net-
works is not the only possible solution to the externality problems we have
identified. As in other areas of business activity, there are tasks better done
by the state and others better done by market participants. Pursuing one ap-
proach does not exclude the other. Take risk reduction as an example: Some-
times the polity prefers state regulation and sometimes the preference is for
market solutions, with the aid of tort law.'52 In the network context, the
choice is between centralized state regulation and decentralized market solu-
tions aided by restitution law. While state involvement might have advan-
tages in some cases, it also has flaws. Political constraints and prohibitive
costs are possible reasons not to prefer state efforts to internalize network
externalities-4he state would confront substantial informational barriers in
seeking to support and maintain spiderless networks. It would be difficult
for any central authority to identify accurately those settings where networks
might flourish. In many of these cases, market mechanisms can prove to be
more effective and productive than state initiatives, and there seems little
justification for precluding the former just because the latter is also feasible.
Indeed, the motivation for this Article is the evidence that many spiderless
networks either fail or do not function efficiently, and it is perhaps for good
ISO For similar proposals, see supra note 96.
Consider the creation of a "business improvement district" ("BID"). A BID is a pub-
lic-private partnership in which property and business owners of a defined area elect to make a
collective contribution to the maintenance, development, and promotion of their commercial
district. They typically provide services such as street and sidewalk maintenance, public-safety
officers, park and open-space maintenance, marketing, capital improvements, and various de-
velopment projects. BIDs are funded through special assessments collected from the property
owners in the defined boundaries of the district. For further details, see DowntownDC Busi-
ness Improvement District, Our Organization, http://www.downtowndc.org (last visited July
24, 2016).
152 See Gumso CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs 95-129 (1970) (discussing the pros
and cons of market deterrence-a market solution-and specific deterrence-a regulatory solu-
tion-as a means to reduce accident costs).
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reason that state taxes and subsidies are not found in the examples we have
identified.
This is not to say that efforts by the state to facilitate internalization
through restitution law would be undesirable. If the state chose to support
network welfare, it could authorize the creation of specialized, expert tribu-
nals to consider restitution claims. Expert tribunals could better evaluate the
losses suffered by some network participants and impose liability accord-
ingly on the network's "winners."'5 3
2. Evaluation Difficulties
Another possible objection to recognizing the restitution claims of net-
work members is the daunting task courts might face in evaluating the many
externalities present in spiderless networks. Indeed, if costs and benefits can-
not be verified at a reasonable cost, no restitution claim would succeed.
Therefore, the ability of courts to develop proxies for difficult-to-verify facts
is a pre-condition for adopting any right of restitution for network members.
In predicting how daunting a task that might be, consider the following
points.
First, when authorizing a restitutionary recovery, courts would prima-
rily be charged with measuring net losses and determining whether the
losers' participation in the network was efficient. Damage measures need not
be accurate. In tort law, for example, damages are often determined through
rough estimates rather than by an accurate calculation of losses, especially
when bodily injury is at stake.15 4
Second, to compensate the losers, courts would also be asked to impose
liability on winners and that requires estimates of benefits internalized and
externalized by them. Note, however, that the exact magnitude of the bene-
fits is not the important fact. Instead, the key is to determine the relative
share of all winners in the creation of the network surplus. Relative shares
are easier to measure than the exact magnitudes of each firm's share. Again,
rough estimates are sufficient here, just as they are in tort cases when liabil-
ity is apportioned among joint tortfeasors or between injurers and their con-
tributorily negligent victims.'
Third, as we suggested above, specialized tribunals can play an impor-
tant role in reducing the costs of verifying restitution claims. Tribunals can
be established by the state, by trade associations, or by network participants
themselves in order to avoid evaluation difficulties.
" See supra Part II.C.5.
154 See, e.g., Welsh v. Martinez, 157 Conn. App. 223, 243 (2015) (ruling that "[p]roper
compensation . . . falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages"); Williams v.
Mathieu, 155 So. 3d 54, 59 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014) ("[P]ain and suffering ... are
inherently speculative in nature and cannot be set with mathematical certainty.").
'1 See DOBBs et al., supra note 92, at 286 ("[A]ttribution of fault percentages is necessa-
rily a rough approximation even though it is expressed in mathematical terms.").
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3. Enforceability
The prospect of ongoing litigation and enforcement costs is a final ob-
jection to extending restitution law to spiderless networks. The creation of
network externalities is not a singular event: networks are dynamic orga-
nisms and externalities are created continuously. Thus, if litigation results
whenever network losses and benefits are shared disproportionately, the
magnitude of enforcement costs over time would be unsustainable. One re-
sponse is that courts, or specialized tribunals, can limit the right to pursue
restitution claims so as to avoid repeat litigation by, for example, precluding
subsequent claims for a period of years. In addition, courts could require
plaintiffs to prove damages based on the defendant's ex ante liability for
expected gains and losses, rather than its ex post liability for realized losses
and gains. While there are various considerations in choosing between these
two liability rules, enforceability convenience is a prime consideration in
this context. One of the advantages of an ex ante liability rule is that it
requires one determination of liability, at the outset, when the network is
created or survival is threatened, and no further liability thereafter.
D. Restitution as a Bargain-Enabling Default
Given the substantial costs of verifying the benefits and costs individual
firms incur in spiderless networks, it is tempting to argue that restitution
claims of the sort we have outlined above rarely will succeed and even less
frequently will be pursued by firms that have suffered lost value in network
activity. Nevertheless, a restitution regime can have a positive effect on im-
proving network efficiency even in a world where successful claims are rare.
The acknowledgement by the state that a restitution remedy is an available
legal option can motivate firms participating in spiderless networks to search
for ex ante contractual solutions that better address the network's goal of
achieving a reciprocity equilibrium. In that sense, a restitution regime can
serve as a bargain-enabling default-a virtual spider in the web-4hat in-
creases the probabilities that parties will more easily resolve the collective
action problems that otherwise plague spiderless networks.
The available evidence suggests that networks with spiders offer a
broad menu of contractual solutions that mitigate the positive and negative
externalities that characterize informal network cooperation. For example,
food cooperatives form organically as spiderless networks, but those that
survive typically then organize around a bureaucratic structure that internal-
izes much of the external effects of informal cooperative behavior.' 56 Simi-
156 See, e.g., Nigel D. Poole et al., Formal Contracts in Fresh Produce Markets, 23 Fool)
POLY 131, 132 (1998) ("The challenges facing the food industry in tackling uncertainty and
thereby reducing transaction costs are being met in part through an array of contractual ar-
rangements, such as partnerships and alliances that aim to achieve greater vertical coordination
and efficiency. . . . Closer coordination can also be achieved through the use of written con-
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larly, franchise networks, construction networks, and modern supply chains
are merely a few examples of ways a central entity can organize network
activity contractually by using master contracts,"' third party beneficiary
law,"' and related contractual means of internalization.
Spiderless networks lack a means of organizing the distribution of net-
work value precisely because high transaction costs impede the creation of a
spider, or any other contractual arrangement, among members. So how
might parties opt out of a restitution default when transaction costs are high?
After all, opting out requires a contractual arrangement, and if contracts are
infeasible, opting out is infeasible as well. Here the coordinating function of
the restitution regime offers a possible solution: A bargain-enabling default,
such as the restitution remedies we have analyzed, economizes on transac-
tion costs by providing focal points that align the parties' expectations and
thus permit them to solve a coordination problem more efficiently. Parties
who participate in networks are involved in a mixed motive game. They
coordinate on certain expectations but have conflicting interests on others.
One way they align their expectations is through communication. When the
parties can communicate, experiments show that their "cheap talk" facili-
tates coordination.'59 As Thomas Schelling famously noted, when the prob-
lem is selecting one means of coordinating among many, focal point
solutions stand out and attract the attention of both parties.16 0 In short, the
state's comparative advantage is its ability to create salience by publicizing
the restitution default. Once announced, the focal point default economizes
tracts."); Rachel E. Goodhue et al., Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape Indus-
try, 23 REV. INDUS. ORG. 267 (2003) ("Contracts ... have been important in broiler chicken
production, and in fruit and vegetable production for many years, and are becoming increas-
ingly important in other commodities . . . ."); H. Christopher Peterson et al., Strategic choice
along the vertical coordination continuum, 4 INT'L Foo) AND AGRIBUSINESS MCelwr. REV. 149,
149-50 (2001) ("Many variations of vertical coordination have evolved . .. in agri-food mar-
kets . . . including joint ventures, keiretsus, virtual corporations, licensing agreements, produc-
tion specification contracts, etc.").
1" See, e.g., Long Term Agreement between Deere & Company and Stanadyne Corpora-
tion (December 11, 2001) (5 year supply contract for the purchase of rotary mechanical prod-
ucts, fuel filtration systems, injection nozzles, and related products by Deere from Stanadyne);
Agreement between Phoenix Technologies Ltd. and Intel Corporation (December 18, 1995)
(supply contract for Phoenix to be a principal supplier of system-level software to Intel); Gen-
eral Terms Agreement between the Boeing Company and Spirit Aerosystems Inc. (June 30,
2006) (general terms agreement covering purchase orders by Boeing for particular product to
be supplied by Spirit); Component Supply Agreement between American Axle & Manufactur-
ing, Inc. and General Motors Corporation (June 5, 1998) (requirements contract for motor
vehicle components to be supplied by AAM to GMM).
'5 See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 334-35 (arguing that the legal ques-
tion regarding third party beneficiary law shouldn't be whether the contract parties intended to
confer a bene?t on the plaintiff. Instead, the correct question is whether it would be ex ante
protable for the network contracting members to serve the potential bene?ciary class to which
the plaintiff belongs).
"9 See, e.g., Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap
Talk, 78 J. EcON. THEORY 286, 287 (1998) ("[W]hen players' preferences are sufficiently
close, communication via cheap talk can be informative.").
'` THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATBOY OF CONFLIcT 54-57 (1963).
49
Harvard Business Law Review
on costly pre-contractual communications: this function is especially valua-
ble when the parties have different possible ways to coordinate and there is
no consensus as to how to do so.
The current default rule in spiderless networks is zero compensation to
network members who have suffered losses from network activity. Appro-
priately designed restitution remedies can create a more attractive focal point
and thereby improve network efficiency. All network firms benefit from an
agreement that reduces uncertainty and avoids expected litigation costs. In-
deed, even short of a fully specified master contract, the parties can always
contract ex ante over future damage claims in order to make the implementa-
tion of an eventual recovery in restitution less costly.
CONCLUSION
In this Article we have proposed recruiting restitution law in order to
support the formation and operation of spiderless business networks. While
some spiderless networks function today without legal intervention, the evi-
dence suggests that many are fragile and fail to form successfully. Our foun-
dational claim is that well-designed restitution remedies will induce more
parties to participate cooperatively in forming durable networks and that
those networks-both existing and new-will generate increasing levels of
trust and cooperation-the core welfare benefits of network value. To be
sure, the chilling effects endemic in a legal regime where expected verifica-
tion costs are substantial, as well as the ancillary risk of crowding out, ar-
gues for a low-powered restitution remedy. In most cases, a court extending
restitution law to spiderless networks should limit any firm that has suffered
uncompensated costs from network activities to the difference between its
costs and benefits, unless the firm can establish its central role as a magnet
enterprise.
The tremendous growth of spiderless networks in recent years has at-
tracted little attention from legal scholars. This neglect is no longer justifia-
ble. Nevertheless, for several reasons our normative claims are tentatively
held. The salient legal issues concern the externalities that some network
members confer or impose on other network members and the consequent
issues of liability and remedy. But since lawyers have largely ignored the
subject, what courts are capable of doing in network contexts are largely
unexplored issues. There is thus little institutional wisdom to exploit. Moreo-
ver, economists that study networks are not concerned with the issues of
liability and strategic defection that occupy lawyers. Hence, the economic
literature offers less wisdom here than it does in other contexts.
Despite these caveats, we believe that, carefully deployed, the law of
restitution offers business parties a useful mechanism for mitigating the
moral hazard and free riding risks that threaten spiderless networks. To be
sure, liability for benefits conferred is much less common in the law than
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liability for harms or for breach of contract-and for good reason.16 1 The new
Restatement on Restitution and Unjust Enrichment shows, however, that res-
titution law can usefully improve efficient operation of business activity in
areas of commercial life that traditionally have been considered to be out of
its sphere. In a similar vein, we argue that courts should entertain and evalu-
ate claims for restitution in terms that promote the efficient formation and
operation of business networks. This normative criterion is more likely to
survive a social welfare analysis than is the disinterested posture of current
law.
16' See Porat, supra note 79, at 198-200 (presenting the law's different approach to benefit
and harm cases, and suggesting justifications).
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